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ABSTRACT 
THE CRITICAL PHASE IN A BUSINESS FAILURE-TURNAROUND 
SEQUENCE: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS AS AN 
INFLUENTIAL TRIGGER IN THE US AND CANADA 
MAY 1990 
C.GOPINATH, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS 
M. A. , UNIVERSITY OF DELHI 
P.G.D.B.A., INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, AHMEDABAD 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
. • Directed by: Professor A. Elliott Carlisle 
This is an exploratory study into the role commercial 
banks play in triggering recognition of failure in a 
declining firm and the nature of the bank's responses. 
Management literature has excluded important issues in the 
critical phase intervening decline and turnaround such as 
how the recognition of failure takes place, and the possible 
external influences on the turnaround strategy. 
Commercial banks being an influential external agency 
are ideally placed to perform this role. The study covered 
four banks in Canada and six banks in the US. The data 
collection comprised of qualitative sources (27 in-depth 
interviews with bank officers) and quantitative sources 
(questionnaire to loan officers seeking information 
pertaining to specific problem loan firms). Information on 
34 cases in the US and 146 in Canada was obtained. The 
quantitative data was studied using correlational analysis, 
factor analysis, and a multiple regression model to help 
explain the bank's response strategies. 
VI1 
The study shows that acting out of self-interest, the 
banks are a source of triggering early recognition of 
failure in the firms and attempt to distinguish between 
decline in performance and impending failure. The variables 
explaining the response strategy of the bank include: the 
causes (internal/external) for decline, extent of security 
coverage, severity of the decline, the extent of cooperation 
with the bank, size, and the bank’s judgement on the ability 
of the firm to turnaround. The bank's response should be 
considered at two levels: the initial efforts of the loan 
officer and the subsequent institutional response of the 
bank. 
While there were only a few major differences between 
US and Canadian banks on several aspects of recognition and 
response, they exhibited different correlation structures. 
While both US and Canadian officers preferred a workout to 
an exit strategy, the US officers had a bias towards a 
financial approach including additional financial coverage, 
and the Canadian officers showed a managerial approach 
including managerial changes. 
From the perspective of strategic management, this 
study shows the importance of a source outside the firm in 
triggering recognition of failure and its influence on the 
turnaround strategy of the firm. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
"Perhaps as a result of the stigma of decline and 
problems with acquiring resources, or perhaps 
because this is a relatively new area of scholarly 
research, people who build and test theories about 
declining organizations have an array of 
opportunities to make new contributions". 
- Kim Cameron, Robert Sutton, 
and Dave Whetten (1988, p.16) 
Since businesses generally wish to grow and make a 
profit, issues concerning decline would not be expected to 
have a continuing and absorbing interest to researchers. Not 
only do the issues have a negative connotation but they can 
often be easily dismissed as problems of recession or 
mismanagement. However, the nature of problems and the 
repercussions of failure are so severe and drastic that the 
issues merit specific attention rather than to be looked 
upon as the absence of success. 
The field of business failures and turnaround has now 
been receiving attention with leading scholars (Whetten, 
1980a) highlighting areas for research and its implications. 
It has been estimated that 75 percent of the academic 
literature on organizational decline has appeared since 1978 
(Cameron, Sutton, and Whetten, 1988). Researchers have been 
looking at issues connected with the causes of decline and 
failure, prediction of failure, nature of turnaround 
strategies and how they should be implemented. A reason for 
the increase in the interest in this field could be the 
reality of the competitive business world of today. The 
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Statistical Abstract of the United States 1989 (which quotes 
the Dun & Bradstreet data) shows a significant jump in the 
number of failures per 10,000 concerns since 1981. While 
this figure had been in the range of 40 during 1968 to 1976, 
it dropped to below 30 between 1977 and 1979. Since then, it 
started a steep climb and has been 61, 88, 110, 107, 115, 
and 120 for the years 1981 to 1986. While the preliminary 
figure of 102 for 1987 is showing a tendency to taper off, 
it is still a disturbing trend. This concern has also been 
reflected in the reports appearing in Business Week, 
Fortune, etc. about the decline of American competitiveness 
and in the increasing debate about the causes for it 
(Lawrence and Dyer, 1983; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Magaziner 
and Reich, 1982). While the optimists may dismiss all this 
as the 'normal' restructuring in the context of a rapidly 
changing world and others may call for an industrial policy, 
for a management scholar, it poses interesting challenges. 
The meaning of failure has been defined variously by 
researchers but for the purposes of this study the primary 
interest will be on situations wherein the decline in the 
performance of the firm is beginning to threaten its 
survival. Turnaround strategy is the name given to the 
efforts directed at reviving a failing enterprise. It 
therefore presupposes that the firm is failing, has the 
potential for recovery and that there is a body of persons 
who are charged with the responsibility for turnaround. 
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This study was undertaken to explore a set of issues 
which have been either ignored or not given due importance 
in the literature. It specifically focuses on the questions 
of recognition of decline and failure, and the responses to 
it. Moving away from the notion of supremacy of management, 
a model is introduced to suggest the high probability of an 
external agency making this recognition, viz. the commercial 
bank. The influence of the bank on the strategy of the 
falling firm is seen through its responses. In order to 
examne the process of recognition of decline and failure 
and the responses under different environmental settings, 
banks in Canada and in the United States were chosen for 
study. 
The report begins (Chapter II) with a discussion of the 
relevant aspects of the literature pertaining to decline and 
turnaround. The review covers the causes and process of 
decline, definitions of decline and failure, the problem of 
recognition, management change issues, and an overview of 
turnaround strategies. This review of the prevailing state 
of the knowledge helps to identify gaps in our .understanding 
which this study seeks to fill. Chapter III develops the 
idea further by looking for a theoretical explanation to the 
questions posed and describes a framework focusing on 
external sources of recognition as a setting for this study. 
In Chapter IV, there is a discussion of the research 
methodology adopted. Due to the exploratory nature of the 
study, a combination of quantitative (through 
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questionnaires) and qualitative (through interviews) methods 
of data collection was used to study banks as institutions 
recognizing a problem loan and loan officers responding to 
specific problem loan clients. 
The outcome of the study is described in Chapter V as a 
set of observations supported by relevant data and analysis. 
The issues covered include the distinction in the severity 
of the problem loan, the process of recognition of a problem 
loan by the bank, the role of the loan officer vis a vis 
that of the bank, the array of responses used by the bank 
and the factors influencing each response strategy. The 
study shows that banks do attempt an early recognition of 
the problem and distinguish between levels of severity of 
the problem in their responses to it. In responding to the 
problem loan through various measures, they attempt to 
influence the turnaround strategy of the firm. Chapter VI 
provides a summary and the main conclusions of the study, 
discusses the limitations, and draws out implications for 
research and for managers. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
"The literature on the management of growth and 
decline is the least well developed.... our 
knowledge of the antecedents and outcomes of 
growth far surpasses our understanding of 
organizational decline." 
- Dave Whetten (1987, p.354) 
The conventional view of research into the sequence of 
decline and turnaround has been to look at the causes of 
decline and thereby discern turnaround strategies. The 
objective in studying causes of decline is to draw lessons 
from the experiences of others and to identify the means for 
reversing downward trends. 
A. Causes of Decline 
Causes of decline are usually looked at broadly as 
being due to strategic reasons (external, improper fit with 
the environment), and operating reasons (internal, 
inefficiencies in operation). An early distinction between 
the two was made by Schendel, Patton, and Riggs (1976). They 
concluded that declines are ultimately caused by inefficient 
conduct of an otherwise suitable strategy or a strategy no 
longer well adapted to the environment. Some authors 
concentrate on strategic issues alone (Gilad, Kaish, and 
Loeb, 1985; Richards, 1973) while others focus more on 
operational causes of decline (Bibeault, 1982; Dolan, 1983; 
Ross & Kami, 1973), or financial reasons (Platt, 1985) to 
explain failure. Looking at the internal organizational 
factors precipitating decline in large established 
corporations, Lorange & Nelson (1987) note that success 
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often triggers decline by encouraging complacency. Miller 
(1977) and Miller & Friesen (1977) using data from published 
case studies arrived at successful and failure archetypes of 
strategy formulation. In discussing the failure archetypes, 
they argue that causes of failures often originate from 
within the company, from intrinsically interrelated factors 
frequently rooted in the behavior of managers such as 
decision making styles, delegation of authority, etc. Many 
other writers on turnarounds have noted that the nature of 
the strategy followed is closely related to the causes of 
decline (Bibeault, 1982; Dolan, 1983; Hambrick & Schecter, 
1983; Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1986; Schendel et al., 1976; 
Whetten, 1980) . They opine that operational causes for 
decline are usually tackled by operating improvements and 
strategic reasons for failure with strategic turnarounds. 
The theme of these writings is to suggest that once the 
causes of failure are identified then a turnaround strategy 
tackling the causes can be initiated. 
B. The Process of Decline 
In addition to identifying the causes which lead to 
failure, it is important to understand the process of 
decline and thereby the timing for the institution of 
turnaround strategies. The earlier the problems are 
identified, the sooner can corrective action be initiated 
(Slatter, 1984), the greater the chances of success. 
Some scholars who have studied the decline process have 
distinguished between phases in the decline. An early 
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attempt at describing the stages of decline was made by 
Argenti (1976b). He described three broad types or 
trajectories which would explain the vast majority of 
failures that occur; each following a different sequence 
marked by different combinations of causes and symptoms. 
Plotting the general health of the company over time, Type 1 
would apply to small and start-up firms who remain at a low 
level of health before collapsing, Type 2 also applying to 
young firms who though alive longer, go through a burst of 
improved health before failing, and Type 3 applicable to 
established firms who experience a decline, then linger for 
a while at a low level of performance before collapsing. The 
objective of identifying these stages was to help an 
organization to recognize that they were following a pattern 
and take corrective action. 
Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988) undertook an empirical 
study of 57 large bankruptcies gathered from secondary 
sources and found that weakness in these firms showed up 
early and there is a substantial period of warning before 
failure. Their research has shown that failing firms follow 
different longitudinal patterns of decline before failing 
and some decline and linger in a state of strategic 
paralysis for many years. They found support for the 
failure typologies proposed by Argenti. 
Weitzel and Jonsson (1989) looked at decline in a 
conceptual framework as occurring by degrees and presented a 
detailed description of the stages of decline. In the first 
stage of decline, called the 'blinded stage', negative 
pressures do not yet manifest themselves in financial 
reports. In the second stage, the 'inaction stage', the 
signs include sliding profits, declining sales, and 
increasing inventories. However, there may not be any 
certainty as to whether the causes are only of a temporary 
nature or more long term. In the third stage, the 'faulty 
action stage', overt indicators multiply but the causes are 
not tackled. This leads to the 'crisis stage’ when the 
organization must undergo major revitalization or suffer 
failure. The last stage of decline, the 'dissolution stage', 
is irreversible. 
These authors have established the importance of 
studying the trajectories of decline. It could be rapid or 
gradual, and an organization could linger at a subsistence 
level for a long time without actually failing. Different 
symptoms are revealed at different stages before the 
organization ultimately collapses. 
C. Decline versus Failure 
It is important at this point to distinguish between 
the terms decline and failure. Definitions in this field are 
still an unsettled issue. Researchers undertaking empirical 
studies have operationalized it in many ways. Using 
Bibeault's (1982) framework, they can be examined as falling 
under economic, legal, and managerial perspectives. 
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1. Economic 
If the rate of return on invested capital is 
significantly and consistently lower than prevailing rates 
on similar investments (Altman, 1983; Bibeault, 1982), it 
would be considered a failure in the economic sense. Using 
the GNP as a benchmark, Schendel et al-. (1976) defined 
decline as 4 years of uninterrupted decline in net income 
normalized by GNP growth, i.e. if growth in net income were 
less than the growth in GNP, then it is a decline. Ramanujam 
(1984) also used a similar definition but for the 
substitution of ROI for net income. Conceptually, it is 
difficult to accept that an organization is in decline just 
because it is growing slower than GNP. The GNP is influenced 
by factors other than industrial growth and different 
industries grow at different rates. Moreover, as it is often 
mentioned in the case of Japan, a firm may consciously 
sacrifice short-term profits in favor of long-term 
interests. It would be an error to classify them as being in 
decline. In O'Neill's (1980) study of the commercial banking 
industry, where an individual bank's rate of growth in net 
income is less than that of the industry, its performance 
for that year is recorded as decline. This definition is 
more realistic as it is confined to a performance measure of 
a specific industry rather than being related to a broader 
notion of GNP. However, looking at rate of growth of income 
or profits in relation to national or industry average would 
still mean that at any point of time half the number would 
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be in decline. This would not necessarily reflect on the 
individual performance of the firm in question. 
2. Legal 
Taking a legal point of view, some scholars have 
defined failure as occurring when an organization files for 
bankruptcy (Chaganti, Mahajan & Sharma, 1985; Hambrick & 
D’Aveni, 1988; Schwartz & Mennon, 1985; Sharma & Mahajan, 
1980) . Platt (1985) makes a technical distinction between 
insolvency when a firm's liabilities excluding equity 
capital exceeds total assets, and bankruptcy which is a 
legal recognition that an individual or company is 
insolvent. Bruno, Leidecker, & Harder (1987) stop short of 
the legal requirement of bankruptcy and follow the 
definition of Dun & Bradstreet (1981) by considering those 
organizations which have ceased operations with loss to 
creditors. This may or may not include filing for 
bankruptcy. 
3. Managerial 
From a managerial standpoint, Bibeault argues that any 
decline in performance can be considered to be a business 
failure. Any stagnation or declining profitability results 
in pressures on management to reverse the trend. He 
operationalizes this in his study to include firms which had 
declined to the point of sustaining losses in net income or 
had severe earnings decline of 80 percent or more. Miller 
(1977) considers failure as protracted periods of poor 
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profits and eroding market share but not necessarily 
bankruptcy. 
An examination of these various definitions indicates 
that there appears to be a confusion between the terms 
decline, failure, and bankruptcy and the conceptual and 
operational forms of the definition. Firms could experience 
a fall in performance and turnaround without being in a 
crisis, and others could continue in that state of decline 
for a long time until a crisis (Schendel & Patton, 1976). 
Whereas the term decline could represent a temporary or 
preliminary condition, failure has a finality to it that is 
more drastic. Bankruptcy, with its precise legal definition, 
is certainly a narrower concept than business failure, since 
the latter does not necessarily involve bankruptcy 
proceedings. Again, filing for bankruptcy does not always 
mean business failure and could be just a means for 
reorganization. (The requirements under the bankruptcy law 
changed in 1978 wherein there is no need to prove insolvency 
for filing under Chapter 11 for reorganization.) Creditors 
do reach agreements with debtors without going through the 
bankruptcy process. Discontinued businesses would also 
include closures of various kinds apart from failure, such 
as retirement, illness of the proprietor, etc. Moreover, as 
LoPucki (1983) points out, by the time a firm has come to 
the stage of filing for bankruptcy, the problems have 
worsened considerably, the seriousness is obvious to all and 
the firm is essentially seeking protection. 
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Argenti (1976b) distinguishes between collapse ('when a 
company, which has hitherto been operating successfully, 
first begins to falter and then has to fight to remain 
profitable... the transformation from corporate health and 
prosperity to a struggle for survival' p.5), and failure ('a 
company whose performance is so poor that sooner or later it 
is bound to have to call in the receiver or cease to trade 
or go into voluntary liquidation, or which is about to do 
any of these or has already done so’ p.6). The term 
'failure' has been used (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) to 
denote total ineffectiveness due to managerial incompetence, 
political vulnerability, or environmental entropy. Whetten 
(1980b) differentiates between death (whether an 
organization still exists) and failure (causes of death). 
D'Aveni (1988) also makes a distinction. He defines decline 
as decreasing internal munificence for a given size of 
organization in terms of its financial and managerial 
resources and failure as unintentional bankruptcy. 
From a managerial point of view, such a distinction in 
the definition of the problem serves to separate the severe 
from the not so severe situations. This study also makes a 
distinction between decline and failure. Failure is looked 
upon as a subset of decline. Decline is any fall in the 
financial performance of the firm leading to its weakening 
due to various internal and external factors. Failure (in 
the sense of impending failure) is viewed as the situation 
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where the drastic fall in the financial performance is 
beginning to threaten the survival of the firm. 
D. The Problem of Recognition 
Taken together, the studies discussed in sections B and 
C above have helped highlight the existence of different 
levels of severity during the stages of decline and the 
implications for turning around the organization at the 
various levels of intensity. The implicit argument still is 
that the earlier the recognition takes place, the better are 
the chances for revival. 
It is interesting that this question of recognition was 
among the earliest issues raised in studies of decline and 
turnaround. Schendel & Patton (1976) studying 36 pairs of 
firms drawn from the Compustat tapes found that turnaround 
is not simply a matter of finding the strategy that works, 
but it requires a "recognition of crisis which can require a 
change in management" (p. 240). While it is important to 
identify the appropriate turnaround strategy, it should be 
preceded by first defining the problem which requires 
recognition. The question of change in management, raised by 
Schendel & Patton, has been considered frequently in the 
literature (and will be discussed below), but the question 
of recognition has largely been ignored in the strategy 
literature. However, when we consider that the probability 
of internal recognition by management seems quite low, the 
importance of recognition gets reiterated. 
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The significance of the question of recognition is 
related with the issue of timing. It is not a matter of 
whether or not management admits failure or recognizes the 
crisis but whether it is done early enough. While 
deteriorating financial results and other signs of poor 
performance may be apparent, they may not be considered as 
indicators of severe problems. This raises the question of 
why it takes so long for some incumbent managements to 
recognize failure. It is "very often delayed until severe 
adversity has caused the firm to decay to a point 
jeopardizing its chance for successful reorganization" 
(Nelson, 1981, p.96). Cameron, Kim, & Whetten (1987) mention 
in a footnote that "with rare exceptions, organizations are 
turned around only after the internal organizational and 
personal consequences of decline are so pervasive and severe 
that a consensus around the need for drastic action 
grudgingly emerges"(p.225). 
Miller (1977) remarks that "the plight of a failing 
firm comes as a great surprise to managers and shareholders 
alike"(p.43). Gilad et al. (1985) look-particularly at the 
behavior of top management. Based on the notion of cognitive 
dissonance from psychology literature and crisis management 
from management literature, they conclude that under certain 
conditions involving a commitment to a course of action, 
information that the action is failing will be ignored, in 
contrast to the economic assumption of perfect (if not 
instantaneous) adjustment of beliefs to actual reality. 
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Lorange & Nelson (1987) also note that self-deception 
results from top managers commitment to an outdated view of 
the business's basic nature. 
Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton (1981) provide a theoretical 
reasoning for the behavior of top management. Their 'threat- 
rigidity hypothesis' explains that there is a tendency for 
human beings to rely on well-rehearsed responses and to 
avoid, or to stop carrying out, less familiar responses. The 
issues of information distortion draws comment from Nelson 
whose study showed that at each level of adversity (low, 
medium, and severe), the information on which decisions are 
based is distorted. Firms facing 'low' levels of adversity 
do nothing, those facing 'moderate' levels improve their 
performance, and those facing 'severe' adversity chose an 
'inappropriate' response. 
These studies strongly suggest that while obviously the 
problem has to be recognized before corrective action can be 
taken, we are rather ignorant about the circumstances 
concerning recognition except to admit its importance. 
Moreover, the literature also suggests that the incumbent 
management is not likely to be among the early triggers. The 
chances of management's recognition is only when the 
severity is extensive and perhaps obvious. 
E. Responses: Management Change 
Considerable attention has been paid in the literature 
on the need for a management change as part of the 
turnaround. This presupposes that if an incumbent management 
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were quick to perceive the tendency towards failure, it 
would have achieved a turnaround. If no steps were initiated 
or they were not successful, the argument would conclude, 
there is need for a change in management. 
The matter of change in management being associated 
with or a precondition for turnaround has almost unanimous 
support. Hofer (1980) is very definitive. "A precondition 
for almost all successful turnarounds is the replacement of 
the current top management of the business in 
question.... the current management has such a strong set of 
beliefs about how to run the business in question, many of 
which must be wrong for the current problems to have arisen 
in the first place, that the only way to get a more accurate 
view of the situation is to bring in new management"(p.26). 
Argenti (1976b) too requires a change in top management and 
Schendel et al. (1976) concluded that "income declines were 
causes for management changes " (p.8). Bibeault (1982) found 
that a new CEO was appointed in 74 percent of the cases to 
effect a turnaround. Schwartz and Mennon (1985) studied 134 
bankrupt companies in the retail industry and found that 
companies often try to solve their problems by making 
leadership changes. They also found that firm size was a 
factor; larger failing companies that made such changes 
displayed a greater preference for external replacements 
than did the smaller ones. Other scholars (Altman & La 
Fleur, 1981; Bibeault, 1982; Dunbar & Goldberg, 1978; 
Finkin, 1987; Khandwalla, 1983; O'Neill, 1982; Starbuck et 
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al., 1978; Williams, 1984) dwell on the need for or 
inevitability of management change. 
The gist of these arguments is that the existing 
management is usually the cause for decline, even if it is 
not, a scapegoat is needed to take the blame, the existing 
team does not have the credibility to manage the turnaround, 
and a symbolic act is needed at this stage to signify the 
onset of change. However, there are two unstated assumptions 
in this argument. One is, who initiates the change? While 
administratively the Board of Directors (BOD) may give 
effect to the change, very few scholars have examined the 
question of how the change gets initiated. Dunbar and 
Goldberg (1978) studying 20 randomly selected cases on 
mismanagement from the German 'Manager Magazin' 
categorically conclude the BOD had failed to perform their 
role. The second issue is that if a management change is not 
possible, as for instance in owner-managed concerns, are 
there other means of intervening in the situation to bring 
about recognition of the problems and initiate a turnaround. 
F. Response of the CEO 
Once failure has been recognized and the need for 
turnaround admitted, either the existing management or the 
new one would have to initiate action. Broadly termed as 
'turnaround strategies' these have been considered 
extensively in the literature. Hoffman (1989) provides an 
excellent review of them and indicates areas for further 
research. The details of turnaround strategies not being 
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within the gambit of this study, a broad review will be 
provided below as a backdrop. 
The discussion on turnaround strategies has been with a 
varied focus - dealing with content (strategic & operational 
measures), process, and a combination of both. While some 
have looked at strategic (Thietart & Vivas, 1984) and others 
at operational issues, there is often no conflict between 
the two (Hofer, 1980; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). . . 
Immediately upon commencement of revival effort efficiency 
moves become critical but the need for strategic re- 
evaluation cannot be denied. Those looking at operational 
factors have invariably moved on to examine the process of 
implementing the strategies (Williams, 1984; Finkin, 1985; 
Zimmerman, 1987). No two turnarounds are the same and by 
highlighting the structural and behavioral factors, these 
scholars have provided effective checklists for any 
turnaround manager to consider. The bulk of the writings in 
the literature do not distinguish between content and 
process and intertwine them in the discussion (Argenti, 
1976a; Bibeault, 1982; Lorange & Nelson, 1987; Ross & Kami, 
1973) . 
However, in requiring a management change or a new CEO, 
there is an implicit assumption in all these studies as to 
the supremacy of the management in formulating and 
implementing a turnaround strategy which is dictated 
directly by the causes of decline. There is no consideration 
of the possibility of external influence on the management 
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in the formulation or implementation of a new stratetgy. 
This need not always be true, especially in the situation in 
which a failing firm finds itself. This researcher 
(Gopinath, 1989) in a study of 22 firms from published 
sources, found that there are considerable external 
influences on a firm at the stage of decline when there is 
open recognition of its problems and further, the source 
which recognizes the decline as being severe and initiates 
action has an influence on the turnaround strategy followed. 
While it is not always possible to identify the single most 
important source of influence, the role of an external 
agency is important to be recognized and studied. Because 
these external agencies come from different perspectives, 
their recommendations for a turnaround strategy may not 
correspond with what the firm might ideally prefer. The 
initial actions taken by the firm are usually considered as 
a part of the turnaround strategy. They, however, need to be 
looked upon differently (called 'immediate term strategy’) 
since the objective at this stage is still to stem the 
decline and not yet turnaround, and some of the actions may 
contradict its turnaround strategy. This study concluded 
that there is a 'critical phase’ intervening between decline 
and turnaround which begins with the recognition of the 
severity of the problems facing the firm and extends till 
the decline is stemmed and the organization prepared for a 
turnaround. The contents of this phase were specified as 
including the question of who recognizes the failure, the 
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process by which action is precipitated, whether management 
changes take place, the decision on liquidation versus 
turnaround, and the content of the immediate term strategy. 
To sum up, the review of related literature shows that 
the lack of clarity surrounding the recognition of decline 
is an important gap in our understanding of the decline 
process. There have been several efforts at understanding 
and classifying the causes of decline and recent studies are 
beginning to map various paths followed in the decline 
phase. The need for early recognition has been indirectly 
approached by studies in the accounting field aimed at 
developing models to predict failure using accounting ratios 
(Altman, 1983, provides a review). Used as part of an 
internal information system, they serve as one more index of 
declining performance. However, the managerial issue of 
differentiating between the severity of the decline and 
accepting the situation as a matter of concern which could 
lead to failure remains. While there has been some passing 
mention in the literature of the need to recognize the 
problem before action is taken, problem recognition has not 
been studied considering its importance from the view of 
timing. Moreover, while studies have shown that the 
management is likely to delay recognition for various 
reasons, and a change in management is a possible 
precondition for turnaround, the possibility of external 
recognition, hov management change could get initiated, and 
external influences on the turnaround strategy have not been 
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studied. 
external 
strategy 
The next chapter will review the probability of an 
source of recognition and its influence on the 
of the firm. 
CHAPTER III 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
"Turnaround is not simply a matter of finding the 
strategy that works; turnaround is much more 
complex and clearly requires; one, a recognition 
of crisis which can require a change in management 
and a financial squeeze to motivate change;...". 
- Dan Schendel and G.R.Patton (1976, p.240) 
In this chapter, the theories developed and used by 
various researchers in studying issues concerning decline 
will be reviewed to build a framework for examining the 
questions raised earlier. 
A. Theories 
Leading scholars have, at various times, bemoaned the 
absence of an accepted theory in this field (Whetten, 1980a) 
which is typical of any new field of study. The literature 
tends to be rarely cumulative and widely dispersed (Cameron, 
Sutton, and Whetten, 1988) . Among the more popular ones are 
the population ecology model and the organizational life 
cycle theory. The models on crisis management have been used 
by fewer scholars. Whetten (1980b) provides a concise review 
of natural selection and organization level models which 
will be briefly examined here. The next section will go into 
the crisis management literature. 
Most studies looking at external causes of decline have 
used the perspective of population ecology; that 
environments select some organizations for extinction and 
allow others to survive. As propounded originally by Hannan 
& Freeman (1977), natural selection occurs as some 
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variations in behavior are eliminated because they are 
undesirable and others are reinforced because they work. The 
criterion of effectiveness is survival. In its pure form it 
is very deterministic, mystifying and removes much of the 
power, conflict, disruption, and social-class variables from 
the analysis of social processes (Perrow, 1986). McKelvey 
and Aldrich (1983) modified this idea by paying attention to 
the internal competencies of organizations, trying to 
specify the adaptations that permit survival, including the 
role of government policies that change the environment, and 
specifying how competencies become retained within the 
organization. Zammuto and Cameron (1985) have specifically 
applied the population ecology approach to decline and 
looked at the decrease in a niche's carrying capacity for 
current activities as well as qualitative shifts within a 
niche to support the activities. They come up.with four 
forms of decline defined in terms of erosion, contraction, 
dissolution and collapse. 
The notion of adaptation to the environment is one 
which is easily accepted since there is still an element of 
choice and decision making in the hands of the managers. It 
is used by several researchers (Boulding, 1975; Dunbar & 
Goldberg, 1978; Miller, 1977; Ross & Kami, 1973; Scott, 
1976; Sutton et al., 1986; Whetten, 1980) to explain, at 
least partly, the reasons for organizational decline other 
than 'bad management'. But on purely theoretical grounds, 
this approach still suffers from problems. One is the very 
24 
definition of population of organizations and what this 
includes or excludes. Moreover, with a constantly changing 
environment, the behavior required for survival is also 
constantly changing so that adaptations learned at one time 
may not serve subsequently. If adaptation by the industry is 
slow, less than optimum members may be able to survive 
longer. "Companies that satisfice, searching for optimal 
actions only when competitive pressures are unusually 
intense, are apt to be especially viable... when firms with 
monopoly power are shielded by entry barriers, product 
differentiation, government favoritism, and the like, 
threats to their survival may be sufficiently blunted that 
they can survive for decades without ever maximizing profits 
or minimizing costs" (Scherer, 1980, p.38). 
Another useful lens for the study of decline are the 
organizational life cycle models. These models use the life 
cycles analogy to view organizations in terms of birth, 
maturation, decline, and death. They are however more 
popularly used for study of growth rather than decline or 
death due to problems in gaining data on dying organizations 
and the obvious conclusion that not all mature organizations 
decline and die (Whetten, 1987). The models also suffer from 
a lack of clarity of how literally they should be applied to 
the study of organizations, the deterministic nature of the 
stages, and whether movement through them is linear or 
recursive. There are also strong linkages between the 
organizational life cycle and the population ecology 
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literatures in looking at the consequences of decline, but 
they also attract the same criticism of being too 
deterministic and not allowing for the conscious efforts of 
human beings (Penrose, 1952). 
To conclude, these models being externally oriented are 
useful to look at external effects on an organization, or 
adaptation to changing environments, including turnaround 
strategies. They however do not lay sufficient emphasis on 
the internal aspects to answer some of the issues raised in 
the previous chapter. The models of crisis management 
provide useful insights and these will now be reviewed in 
greater detail to develop a conceptual framework for use in 
this study. 
B. Crisis Management Literature 
Many scholars use the word 'crisis' in describing 
decline or events during a decline. However, very few have 
used the theories in the crisis management literature to 
analyze the decline phase. 
In the literature on crisis management, the word 
'crisis' is defined as a situation that 'threatens the high- 
priority goals of the organization, restricts the amount of 
time available for response and surprises decision makers by 
its occurrence, thereby engendering high levels of stress' 
(Hermann, 1963). In a typical industrial crisis situation 
such as Three Mile Island or the Bhopal disaster, the 
elements of surprise, high threat, and short decision time 
can be easily discerned. A disaster can be looked upon as a 
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specific case of a crisis since the precipitating event is 
obvious. 
Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman (1980) extend 
Hermann's model to make it more explicitly perceptual since 
crisis is defined by a set of variables as perceived by the 
decision maker and therefore it resides in the person as 
well as in the situation. They also explicitly include the 
event which triggered the crisis. This is an important 
distinction which was originally introduced into the 
literature by Turner (1976) as an important first step in 
perceiving the situation. Indicators can be disregarded or 
misinterpreted due to the complexity of the information, 
rigidities in perception and belief, or disregard of the 
perceptions of outsiders. According to his thesis, the 
crisis can thus develop into a disaster. Fink, Beak and 
Taddeo (1971) define crisis as a state of an organization 
when its repertoire of coping responses is not adequate to 
bring about the resolution of a problem which poses a threat 
to the system. They add that most often it is precipitated 
by an identifiable event, either within or outside the 
system. 
A crisis may or may not lead to organizational failure, 
and while crisis is usually sudden, decline can be very 
gradual (Argenti, 1976; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988). Models in 
crisis management also make the distinction between a 
problem and a crisis which is akin to the distinction 
between decline and failure. Cowan (1986) presents a model 
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of what takes place prior to the problem being labelled as a 
crisis. In order to understand the problem recognition 
process, he draws on the information processing literature 
to capture key activities and their sequence. He suggests 
that individuals move among three stages: gestation, 
categorization, and diagnosis. If suitable corrective action 
is not taken, the problem develops into a crisis. 
Since they deal with very similar issues, insights 
gained in this field of crisis management can be adapted for 
study in the field of failure. By including the notion of 
recognition and triggers, and distinguishing between problem 
and crisis, the crisis management concepts are eminently 
suitable for examining business failures. A few authors have 
used aspects of the crisis literature to understand 
organizational decline. Defining crisis as times of danger 
when some actions lead towards organizational failure, 
Starbuck et al. (1978) look for internal and external 
reasons for the crisis, reasons for resisting change, need 
for constant learning by the organization, etc. Smart et al. 
(1978) develop a model for identifying those configurations 
of attributes which increase or decrease the vulnerability 
and susceptibility of organizations to crises. But the 
analysis deals with only strategic and does not include 
operational factors. In analysing 40 turnaround situations 
in the UK, Slatter (1984) finds the models of crisis 
management very appropriate. 
28 
C. The Process Model of Recognition 
The review of crisis management literature from the 
perspective of studying business decline provides important 
elements to serve as the basis for this study. The first is 
the distinction in the severity of the situation as being a 
problem or a crisis. This can have different implications 
for responses to the situation. The second is the importance 
of recognition of the problem or the crisis. It is possible 
for the 'problem' to develop into a 'crisis' (or become a 
disaster) if there is no recognition. The third is the 
suggestion that there is a need for triggers to bring about 
recognition, and these could also be the events which cause 
the crisis. We have seen earlier that there is a strong 
possibility of an incumbent management not recognizing the 
problem. This immediately suggests the need for or the 
possiblity of external recognition. While the literature on 
strategic management is silent on external recognition, it 
has been taken note of as being an important first step, in 
the accounting field (McAuliffe, 1987). 
A decline in financial performance in usually not a 
sudden event but occurs over a period of time (Slatter, 
1984). During this period, the normal slack in the 
organization prevents the firm from failing and slipping 
into crisis (D'Aveni, 1988; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988). The 
downward spiral results in a lingering decline and 
paralysis. If no corrective action is taken, firms could 
continue in that state until a crisis (Schendel & Patton, 
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1976; Bibeault, 1982). The need for a turnaround is usually 
present in the period of managerial complacency which tends 
to precede the onset of a crisis (Slatter, 1984) but it is 
not easy to diagnose since the management systems and 
processes which produce crisis are substantially the same as 
those that produce success (Hedberg, Nystrom & Starbuck, 
1976) . 
The elements of a crisis described earlier, viz. 
surprise, high threat, and short decision time, cause stress 
which affects managerial behavior (cognitive performance), 
which often diminishes the quality of decision making. 
Holsti (1978) identifies the major effects of crisis-induced 
stress as being a reduction in management's span of 
attention, an increase in their managerial inflexibility and 
a reduction in their time perspective. This creates a 
situation where outside intervention is necessary to trigger 
the change process (Slatter, 1984) which could include a 
change in management. If the problem is identified early 
enough, the same order of strategic change in terms of 
product-market reorientation, financial policy, etc. may be 
necessary but the extent of organizational change would be 
far less or possibly accomplished in a less painful manner. 
The many possible sources of external triggers include 
banks, investor groups, auditors, government, labor union, 
etc. 
Nelson (1981) arguing in favor of economic self- 
interest, says that bankruptcy is .."triggered only when 
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economic actors perceive that the process will promote their 
interests" (p.95). From this perspective, he discusses the 
role of stockholders, directors, executives, and creditors 
(secured and unsecured). He describes how each one would be 
affected differently by the choices facing the firm. But he 
provides only institutional descriptions of the hardships 
facing firms threatened by bankruptcy and does not offer an 
alternative model which formalizes the disequilibrium or the 
adjustment process. 
Fig. 1 (p. 36) provides a conceptual representation of 
the issue of recognition during the decline phase. When an 
organization slips into a decline phase and there is 
internal recognition, corrective action could be initiated 
leading to a successful outcome. The internal recognition 
could, and often does, come as a result of a crisis such as 
liquidity, departure of key personnel, etc. If either there 
is no internal recognition or the actions do not cause a 
turnaround, the stage is set for external recognition and 
intervention. This could happen as a result of a crisis or 
the process of external recognition could represent the 
crisis. The role of the external agent in the process of 
precipitating the crisis/creating the internal recognition 
would also extend to influencing the corrective action due 
to their stake in the existence of the firm. During this 
'critical phase’ as described earlier, action is taken to 
stem the decline, management change(s) may take place, and 
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the organization is ready for a turnaround (revival) or 
liquidation. 
D. Commercial Banks and Their Role 
Virtually no business firm, small or large, operates 
without bank loans, whether an operating line of credit or a 
term loan. Though being an external agency, banks are privy 
to confidential information about a client through receipt 
of regular reports as required under the loan covenants, and 
they closely monitor the performance of their clients in 
order to protect their (banks) assets. Commercial banks, 
thus, become ideally situated to perform the role of an 
external trigger. 
As a trigger and indeed as an influential player in the 
entire turnaround process, commercial banks seem to occupy a 
pivotal position in many firms' rescue. In the U.K. context, 
Slatter (1984) mentions that it is usually the banks that 
initiate the turnaround process. He argues that "the trigger 
for change during a severe crisis is more likely to be an 
intervention from an outside source, most commonly banks or 
lending institutions" (p. 75). In Japan also, where 
commercial banks often hold at least a nominal amount of 
their client's equity, they play a dominant role in the 
turnaround. In the U.S. while authors have examined the 
concerns surrounding a bank's response to problem loans 
(Bauch, 1987; Nemer, 1982), the content and process of 
intervention has not been empirically studied. Of late, the 
negative aspects of this influence has been brought into the 
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limelight because of a tendency on the part of some bankrupt 
firms to blame the banks for their failure (Gubernick,1986; 
McLaughlin,1986) and sue them on the grounds of lender 
liability, i.e. that the banks did not respond to their 
requests for additional assistance or influenced in a manner 
leading to their failure. 
From the banking perspective, problems in a client firm 
affecting its performance and repayment capacity fall within 
the purview of problem loans. These are defined as loans 
which present problems as far as collection of interest 
and/or principal are concerned and can result in losses to 
the bank. Loans, for a bank, are its assets and any problem 
in them directly affects not only the income but also the 
balance sheet of the bank. Problem loans and losses are the 
result of many factors, mainly either unwillingness to repay 
or inability to do so. Reed (1963) is representative of many 
authors who point out that "only an infinitesimally small 
percentage of the borrowers become unwilling to repay loan 
obligations" and "the rajor reason by far for problem loans 
and possible losses is the inability of borrowers to realize 
income from normal business operations.."(p.400). Thus, the 
bank's view of problem loans is a surrogate of a managements 
view of its decline. 
The banking literature further recognizes (Hatch & 
Vynant, 1986) that management is often slow in admitting the 
problem requiring close monitoring by the bank which may 
have to "spur management into action'' (p. 250) and that it 
33 
is critical that the banker take action at an early stage. 
Argenti (1976b) considers the role of th<- bank in 
supervising management so important that he recommends a 
bank’s representative be appointed on the boards of 
companies which have significant borrowings. 
E. Cash Flow Crisis and Recognition by the Bank 
Among the early signs of decline in a firm’s 
performance is the problem of a worsening cash flow leading 
to a liquidity crisis. Schendel and Patton (1976) in raising 
the importance of recognition of the crisis suggest that it 
can cause a change in management and a financial squeeze to 
motivate the change. There are several studies in the 
accounting literature on the use and reliability of cash 
flow as against other financial ratios for prediction of 
failure (Casey and Bartczak, 1984; Zeller and Mendelow, 
1989). However, there appears to be no disagreement on the 
occurrence of cash flow crisis during a severe decline in 
the financial performance of the firm and when internal 
slack has been used up. While there is disagreement on 
whether a bank will force liquidation of a problem loan and 
the conditions under which it is advantageous to do so 
(Bulow and Shoven, 1978; Ang and Chua, 1980) the importance 
of the commercial bank to the firm during its liquidity 
problems is beyond doubt. This importance is reiterated by 
the study of Giroux and Wiggins (1984) of 22 bankrupt and 26 
non-bankrupt firms which shows that net losses, debt 
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ideally situated to perform the role as external agents who 
closely monitor the performance of their clients to protect 
their own interests. While the implicit assumption of 
strategic management is that the CEO (incumbent or new) is 
supreme in formulating a turnaround strategy, the admission 
of an external agent performing a crucial role of 
recognition lays open the fascinating possibility of the 
same agent's responses to the situation as being an external 
influence on the strategy. This has helped to develop a 
framework of external recognition and response to serve as a 
scaffolding for this research. 
Fici.1 Process Mode!! of Recognition 
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
"It is far better to have an approximate answer to 
the right question, which is often vague, than an 
exact answer to the wrong question". 
- Catherine Marshall & Gretchen Rossman (1988, p.17) 
Empirical research in turnarounds has suffered from 
several difficulties. Given that the general business 
culture is preoccupied with growth and profitability, there 
is a tendency among managers to avoid talking about decline 
and questions may result in a display of emotion, in 
addition financial support is also difficult to obtain 
(Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988) . One must often contend 
with a reluctance to divulge complete information in 
situations where cover-up's and scapegoating are not 
uncommon. Moreover, the nature of the phenomenon is such 
that an organization is most easily identified as having 
failed after the failure has taken place and the 
organization is in the process of a turnaround or 
liquidation. Due to these problems, empirical ressearch into 
decline and crisis have been minimal. Moreover, these 
limitations and the issue of confidentiality have forced 
researchers make compromises and settle for less than the 
optimum in data sources, and hence accuracy. Therefore much 
of the research has relied on published information and has 
often used bankrupt firms as their data points since data is 
more readily available on them. 
In this chapter, a brief overview of past empirical 
research will first be made before discussing the data 
sources, collection methods and techniques of analysis in 
this study. 
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A. Overview of Empirical Research 
In this section, the nature of data used for empirical 
research into decline, in the form of secondary data, case 
histories, and primary data will be reviewed. 
1. Secondary Data: Large Data Bases 
A survey of the research in this field shows a 
preponderance of studies using secondary data from large - * 
data bases. The sources used include Business Failure Record 
(Dun & Bradstreet), S&P Register, COMPUSTAT, PIMS, Moody's 
Industrial Manual, and the D&B Directory. The bulk of the 
work, using both univariate and multivariate statistical 
analysis, has been in prediction of failure with company 
financial data (Altman, 1983; Beaver, 1966; Giroux & 
Wiggins, 1984; Keasey & Watson, 1987; Sharma & Mahajan, 
1980). Giroux & Wiggins and Keasey & Watson supplement their 
approach with non-financial data. Sometimes, as Schendel et 
al. (1976) did, the database is used only to identify firms 
satisfying certain criteria, and then the analysis is done 
using case material. 
Often, the firms are identified on the basis of 
bankruptcy filings (Altman, 1983; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988; 
LoPucki, 1983; Nelson, 1981; Sharma & Mahajan, 1980; 
Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Wilcox, 1976) and then the variables 
are operationalized using the accounting data from the data 
bases and supplemented from company annual reports. 
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While most of these studies have looked at the decline 
phase, the studies using databases to study aspects of 
turnarounds have been by Hambrick & Schecter (1983) and 
Ramanujam (1984) who studied the effect of environmental and 
organizational contexts on turnarounds. 
For pure research methodology purposes, Begin, Cesta, 
and Apilado's (1979) study is valuable as it compares data 
on business failure rates from the only two publicly 
available sources available viz. the D & B Business Failure 
Record and the bankruptcy records of the US Administrative 
Courts. When using published data, it is important to be 
careful about the assumptions made and definitions used in 
collection which could be very different from those of the 
researcher. Begin et al. clarify the differences which exist 
between these two data bases and highlight the consequences 
of accepting one versus the other for analytical and policy 
development purposes. While both sources seek to measure the 
same thing, they both rely on sample rather than census. 
Since they do not describe the same underlying population, 
use of one or the other for cross-sectional or -time series 
investigations of business failures/bankruptcies might lead 
to very different conclusions. 
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2. Case Histories 
Case histories appear to be the second most popular 
source of information as it provides the richness of detail 
which is valuable for looking at the content and process of 
turnaround. The case studies which are either available as 
cases or put together by the researcher from published 
sources such as the journals and the popular press, are 
content analyzed. Miller & Friesen (1977) uniquely undertake 
fairly sophisticated quantitative analysis using the scores 
on 31 variables on a 7-point scale given by raters to the 
cases. Others (Dunbar & Goldberg, 1978; Hall, 1980; O'Neill, 
1982, 1986; Richards, 1973; Schendel et al., 1976; 
Zimmerman, 1986) use case material to arrive at common 
strategies and patterns in the process. In-depth studies of 
a single case have also been used (Altman & La Fleur, 1981; 
Finkin, 1983; Sutton et al., 1986) by researchers to either 
illustrate a conceptual argument or to draw conclusions from 
them. 
3. Primary Data 
Data collected through questionnaires, interviews, and 
field research has not been as extensively used. Looking at 
failure related problems, Cameron et al. (1987) used data 
from educational institutions to look at attributes and 
dysfunctional effects of decline, using sophisticated 
quantitative techniques. Behavioral issues particularly 
associated with the triggering of bankruptcy are dealt with 
qualitatively by Nelson's (1981) sample of 13 firms. 
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Harrigan (1980) also qualitatively analyses the strategies 
followed by firms in declining industries and collected data 
from firms, interviews of individuals, suppliers, industry 
associations, etc. Bibeault (1982) in his survey of 81 
CEO’s, uses summary statistics to look at the causes for 
decline and turnaround strategies. 
It is a researchers dream to be able to obtain 
perfectly objective and large amounts of data on a random 
basis for his study. Most often compromises must be made to 
suit the situation. While randomness and a large 'n' is 
possible using the data bases, they end up dictating the 
operationalization of the variables and thereby limit the 
issues which could be studied. Moreover, as only large 
publicly held firms are included in these sources, there is 
an inherent bias in size against the small and medium size 
enterprises. Primary data, as explained earlier, is most 
difficult in this field as firms in a state of decline do 
not have the time, and/or the inclination to welcome 
researchers (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). 
B. This Study: Objectives and Research Questions 
This study was undertaken to gain a better 
understanding of the question of recognition of firms in 
decline and the related external influences on turnaround 
strategies. This was achieved by looking at commercial 
banks' identification of problem loans and reactions of the 
banks to the situation. 
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There are several advantages to this approach. As 
explained earlier, a commercial bank is an external agency 
which has access to confidential information about the 
performance of a client firm. In order to protect its 
assets, it is engaged in continuously monitoring the 
performance of its client, and is therefore ideally situated 
to make an early recognition of the decline. The additional 
advantage of taking the view of the bank is the dynamic 
aspect of capturing the information while the event is 
current. Billings et al. (1980) who surveyed organizations 
and institutions which had in the recent past experienced a 
crisis due to curtailment in gas allocations, comment that 
the ideal design would have been to gather data during the 
crisis. Cameron et al. (1988) comment that few studies exist 
using the process approach to decline. 
The lack of an understanding of the external influences 
on recognition points to the need for an exploratory study. 
Commercial banks having been chosen as an influential 
trigger, it is necessary to discern the cues used to 
identify the problem loan, the process of identification, 
the nature of response, and the various factors which 
influence the response. An exploratory study using 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies would be able to 
clarify the process and identify variables of importance for 
further research. Thus it is believed that this study would 
contribute to a better understanding of an important element 
in the decline process. 
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In approaching this study, the following were set as 
the areas of inquiry. 
1. Failure Recognition 
It has been argued earlier that when there is a decline 
in the financial performance of a firm, it need not be 
immediately life threatening. Even when it is, chances are 
that the incumbent management is usually among the last to 
recognize the failure. A distinction can be made between a 
fall in the financial performance of the firm (decline) and 
when the decline is threatening the very existence of the 
firm (failure). The commercial bank is uniquely positioned 
to make this distinction since it is an external agency with 
access to detailed information and banks monitor clients' 
performance as part of a regular review. It would therefore 
be useful to inquire into whether such a distinction is made 
and the criteria used, leading us to the following two 
questions: 
Ql.l: Does a commercial bank make the distinction 
between decline and failure? 
Q1.2: What are the criteria they use to make this 
distinction? 
2. Response of the Banks Following Problem Recognition 
Once a bank recognizes their loan to be at risk due to 
the client being in a decline or impending failure, this 
fact would trigger some responses on the part of the bank. 
The reasons for the decline could be several and the banks 
not being experts in managing the units might take time 
either to watch for further deterioration or to study the 
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decline. Moreover, there are conflicting objectives 
influencing the responses of the bank. These include the 
issue of lender liability (the liability attributed to a 
lender arising out of wrongful action or inaction towards a 
defaulting borrower), the public image of the bank, need to 
protect the loan risk of the bank, and the need to retain a 
client given competitive market conditions. In addition, 
there could be the desire to give management the benefit of 
doubt. Thus., even if the bank recognizes a problem, there 
could be a delay before it warns the client. This raises the 
following two questions: 
Q2.1: What is the nature of the lag between recognition 
of failure and response to it? 
Q2.2: What factors would explain this lag and what 
could be the consequences of it? 
As the consequences of decline and failure are 
different for the client and the bank, the latter would be 
expected to respond differently to each. The responses of a 
bank can be characterized as financial (extension of credit, 
deferment of interest, additional collateral/guarantees), 
managerial (change management, assistance in financial 
controls, strategic planning, etc.), or legal (steps to 
recall the loan). These responses are essentially 
interventions in the client's situation. To understand this 
better, we need to inquire into the following: 
Q2.3: What is the array of responses available to a 
bank following recognition of a problem loan? 
Apart from conflicting objectives, various 
characteristics of the client influence the timing of 
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response including the size of the client, whether the loan 
is secures or unsecured, the bank’s estimate of success in 
recovery of funds, etc. 2lucres of bank officers’ ability to 
predict failure have shown variance due to individual 
differences in information processing style (Casey, 1980) . 
This leads to the following two questions: 
12.4: Do banks follow a common approach in their 
response to prorlen ioar. situations ? 
12.4: what factors would influence their response in 
addition to their analysis of the causes of the problem? 
2. Influence of the ranging and regulatory Environment 
Banking is one industry which is regulated in one for* 
or the other all over the world on account of its key 
position m the economy. The severe1 influences in the 
environment would also affect tneir reravior, especially ir. 
dealing with problem loans. lifferer.ces in the size of the 
ranks regulation and bankruptcy legislation can affect a 
sank s approacr. In orcer to loov at the environmental 
influence, it was felt that banr.s in the VI and Canada would 
provide a useful comparison. 
The nature of the regulators environment hanks operate 
m differs be tween the Canada and the US - Appendix A 
provisos a nnef look at the sufferer. m narking 
street.res arc rarrr.ptcy * eg* is - 
countries.. apart fron specific 
operations of nan ns, the don mar 
allow free market forces to oper 
ation retwaen the two 
regulations controlling the 
t relief in tne VC is to 
are to decide tne survival 
ater expectation of nano of tne f _ rn. however, tnere is a gre 
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response including the size of the client, whether the loan 
is secured or unsecured, the bank's estimate of success in 
recovery of funds, etc. Studies of bank officers' ability to 
predict failure have shown variance due to individual 
differences in information processing style (Casey, 1980). 
This leads to the following two questions: 
Q2.4: Do banks follow a common approach in their 
response to problem loan situations ? 
Q2.4: What factors would influence their response in 
addition to their analysis of the causes of the problem? 
3. Influence of the Banking and Regulatory Environment 
Banking is one industry which is regulated in one form 
or the other all over the world on account of its key 
position in the economy. The several influences in the 
environment would also affect their behavior, especially in 
dealing with problem loans. Differences in the size of the 
banks, regulation and bankruptcy legislation can affect a 
bank's approach. In order to look at the environmental 
influence, it was felt that banks in the US and Canada would 
provide a useful comparison. 
The nature of the regulatory environment banks operate 
in differs between the Canada and the US. (Appendix A 
provides a brief look at the differences in banking 
structures and bankruptcy legislation between the two 
countries). Apart from specific regulations controlling the 
operations of banks, the dominant belief in the US is to 
allow free market forces to operate to decide the survival 
of the firm. However, there is a greater expectation of bank 
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and government involvement to assist firms in Canada (Bank 
Facts, 1987). There are also differences in the Bankruptcy 
Acts governing business in the two countries. The lack of a 
Chapter 11 protection in Canada has been mentioned as part 
of the reason why banks recall loans and force small to 
medium enterprises into liquidation than might otherwise 
have been possible (Francis, 1988). This leads to the 
following question: 
Q3: Given the differences in the banking and regulatory 
environment, how do the Canadian and US banks differ in the 
areas of recognizing business failure and responding to 
them? 
The research approach used may be termed triangulation, 
which is defined as a combination of methodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon (Denzin, 1978). Given the 
difficulties of studying decline during its occurrence, a 
mix of quantitative and qualitative methods in a 
complimentary manner (Jick, 1979; Rossman and Wilson, 1985) 
was chosen as the most appropriate. The qualitative approach 
consisted of interviews. The quantitative approach was 
reflected in the data collected through administering a 
questionnaire. These will be discussed in greater detail 
below. 
C. Data Collection 
The source of data for the study was commercial banks. 
Through the assistance of faculty in the School of Business, 
University of Massachusetts, cold calls, and personal 
contacts of the researcher, six banks in the US (mostly New 
England area) and four in Canada (Montreal/Toronto area) 
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were approached. The objectives of the study and method was 
explained to them. They were also assured of total 
confidentiality of the names of the bank, its officers and 
clients. 
In the first stage, the main or initial contact in 
the bank was appraised of the study and its intentions. 
(Appendix B gives a sample of the letter written to the 
banks.) On securing an appointment, a verbal presentation 
was made and their participation requested in permitting (a) 
interviews of one or two officers, both at senior policy 
making levels in the lending or workout functions and at the 
loan officer level, and (b) administering questionnaires to 
a larger number of account managers/loan officers who would 
have problem loans in their portfolio. All the four banks 
contacted in Canada agreed to participate in both aspects of 
the study, but completed questionnaires were received from 
only three of them. Of the six in the US, two declined to 
permit distribution of questionnaires and restricted the 
number of interviews. Many banks in the Northeast region are 
currently going through a bad phase with an above normal 
percentage of non-performing loans due in part to the 
depressed real estate market. This could account for their 
reluctance to permit an outsider inquiring into their 
methods of responding to problem loans. 
1. Interviews 
In-depth interviews were held with bank officers 
involved in: 
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a) lending (at the senior policy making level and account 
managers/loan officers who deal with the clients), 
b) loan review, an internal department which reviews 
accounts on a regular or random basis to detect problems in 
loans, and 
c) workout, the department usually charged with the 
responsibility of working with the client and turning it 
around or liquidating and collecting the loan. 
In addition, to get the regulatory perspective, one 
official of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions, Canada, and one from the Massachusetts 
Department of Banking were interviewed. 
At the time of fixing appointments over the telephone, 
officers were given a brief summary of the objectives of the 
study and told that the interview would last between 45 
minutes and an hour. The interviews were conducted in a 
semi-structured format and Appendix C lists the questions 
which were used as a guideline to ensure the basic issues 
are covered. During the course of the interview many of the 
issues were developed further. At the beginning of the 
interview the permission of the interviewee was sought for 
recording the discussion. Except in the case of two 
officers, they were all tape recorded and transcribed. The 
interviews lasted 1 hr each on an average. 
2. The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed to seek specific 
information from the level of the loan officer/account 
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manager on particular problem loan cases. (Appendix D 
includes a sample). It contained an introductory letter 
explaining to the respondent the intent of the study and 
providing instructions regarding completion. The cover 
letter included the name of the bank so it was possible to 
identify the respondent's bank but there was no requirement 
for the respondent to be identified. 
There were two parts to the questionnaire. Part A 
contained questions about the respondent such as years of 
experience, number of problem loans handled, ways of 
monitoring loans, etc. Some of the questions included space 
where the respondents could include 'other' options in the 
response and two of the questions were open ended covering 
how problem loans are recognized and whether a distinction 
is made in the severity of the problems facing the client. 
Part B asked the respondent to keep one current problem loan 
client in mind and answer the questions with reference to 
that client. The cover letter requested the officer to 
choose a client who had been in existence for five years. 
(This was, however, not always possible.) This was done to 
eliminate start-up firms which suffer from other problems 
beyond the scope of this study. Two copies of Part B were 
included in every questionnaire set with a request that if 
the respondent could think of another problem loan in 
his/her portfolio spanning a different set of issues, the 
second copy could be used to respond. There was no 
requirement for the client to be identified and the copies 
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were differentiated with a client code ‘I’ and 'II'. The 
variables included under topics such as "cues for 
recognition", "causes for decline", "objectives influencing 
the response", and "different types of interventions being 
considered" were drawn fro* a review of the current 
literature including Reed et al.(1984), Argenti (1976), and 
articles appearing in the Journal of Conusercial Bank 
Lending. The questionnaire was pre-tested by four officers 
and revisions were nade to take into account their comaents. 
The distribution of the questionnaire was left entirely 
to the discretion of the contact officer in the bank. Once 
the officer pereitted (or obtained permission for) 
distribution of the questionnaire, the number of copies 
specified by hi*/her was provided. The officer was 
requested to distribute the questionnaires to those who 
currently had proble* loans in their portfolio). A self- 
addressed stamped envelope was provided in the sets 
distributed in the US. The Canadian ones were not pre- 
stanped but as can be seen from the response figures, this 
did not materially affect the response rate. Though 
distribution was through one officer in the bank, all 
completed questionnaires were to be nailed directly to the 
researcher. Therefore the respondent was assured that the 
bank officials would not know about his/her responses. In 
the case of one Canadian bank which intended distribution to 
officials in the Quebec area, a French translation of the 
questionnaire was provided. 
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D. Data Overview 
This section will provide a brief review of the data in 
terms of the banks/loan officers studied and the clients 
(problem loan cases) on whom the information was reported. 
1. Bank Data 
Table 4.1 provides information on the banks and loan 
officers. The number of banks in whom interviews were 
conducted and/or questionnaires obtained were six in the US 
and four in Canada. Fourteen officials in the US and eleven 
in Canada were interviewed. 
The number of loan officers who returned completed 
questionnaires is 23 in the US and 90 in Canada; they 
reported on 34 and 146 clients respectively. Canadian banks 
being larger in size, have a larger number of loan officers 
who may have problem loans in their portfolio. The US banks 
being smaller in size, there was a limited number of 
potential respondents. In addition, the extent of 
cooperation in the study was distinctively higher among the 
Canadian banks contributing to a larger response. (Three of 
the returned questionnaires from Canada were unusable due to 
missing pages). The average years of experience of the loan 
officers was similar in both the countries, about 11.2 
years. The mean number of problem loans handled by each 
officer over these years was not significantly different and 
was about 39. These figures also show that experienced 
officials responded to the questions giving credibility to 
their responses. A majority of the respondents (85%) do not 
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specialize in any particular industry in their lending 
activity and can be considered as generalists. 
2. Client Data 
As mentioned above, the loan officers provided 
information on 34 clients in the US and 146 in Canada whom 
they considered problem loans. (Table 4.2 provides summary 
information about these clients). Client firms were 
distributed over seven different categories of businesses. 
The majority of client firms in the US were in retail, 
finance, insurance and real estate, or services, while in 
Canada, they were mostly distributed between mining & 
manufacturing, retail and services. Quite a few were in 
construction in both countries and were classified under 
'others’. 
In order to avoid the cases of start-up failures (which 
involves other reasons beyond the scope of this study) the 
respondents were requested to preferably choose firms at 
least five years in existence. In our sample, 68 percent in 
the US and 58 percent in Canada were six years or older. 
(85% of the US firms and 75% of the Canadian firms were 
older than three years.) While there were no stipulations 
regarding type of management, an overwhelming majority (94%) 
in both countries were owner managed. In terms of size, 59 
percent were considered small and 41 percent as mid-market 
accounts. The important implications of the size and 
management issues will be discussed in the next chapter. In 
the case of 79 percent of the US and 77 percent of the 
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Canadian firms, the reporting bank was the sole bank. If one 
includes the cases where they were at least the lead bank, 
this percentage rises to 82 and 98 respectively. We conclude 
that the views of the loan officer of the bank is that of a 
dominant lender. 
E. Data Analysis Methods 
The qualitative data obtained from the interviews and 
the responses to the open-ended questions were analyzed 
through systematic methods. Miles and Huberman (1984) 
provide an exhaustive review of the methods available. In 
brief, the process followed in this study involved going 
over the transcripts to identify low-level categories which 
were noted on index cards. These were then combined over 
different iterations during which patterns started emerging. 
Turner (1988) calls this process of sorting out and 
classifying the issues as trying to 'botanize' in the same 
manner as a botanist would. 
The quantitative data obtained was studied using 
univariate statistics and relationship between variables was 
studied using correlation and regression techniques. Data 
reduction methods such as factor analysis was employed to 
see the groupings among the variables. Differences between 
the US and Canadian samples were studied using t-tests. A 
regression model was also developed to understand the 
influence of different variables on the responses of the 
bank. 
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The next chapter will present a description of the main 
observations of the study and their implications. 
Table 4.1 
Bank Data 
Item U.S Canada 
No. of Banks participating 6 4 
Persons interviewed 14 11 
Completed questionnaires received from 
Loan Officers 23 9(h 
No. of problem loan cases 
reported 34 146 
Mean experience (years) of the 
loan officer (s.d.) 
11.9 
(6.4) 
u.i 
(7.5) 
Mean number of problem loans 
handled by the officers (s.d.) 
40.4 
(53.7) 
38.52 
(42.8) 
% of loan officers who do not specialize in 
any particular industry 83 85 
Notes : 1) 3 questionnaires received had pages missing and were excluded. 
2) One outlier reporting ’over a thousand’ excluded. 
Table 4.2 
Client Profile 
Item U.S Canada 
No. of cases (firms) 43 146 
Age of the business (% distribution) 
Less than 3 years 15 22 
4 - 5 years 18 20 
6-10 years 21 20 
More than 10 years 47 38 
Size of the firm (% distribution) 
Small 65 57.5 
Medium 35 41.8 
Large - .7 
Nature of the business (% distribution) 
Agriculture,forestry and fishing - 8 
Mining and manufacturing 12 19 
Transportation and public utilities - 3 
Wholesale trade 15 12 
Retail trade 21 17 
Finance, insurance and real estate 18 3 
Services 23 20 
Other 12 19 
Cases where loan officer represents 
sole or lead banker (%) 82.4 98.6 
Whether firm is owner-managed 
Yes (%) 94.1 93.2 
No (%) 5.9 6.8 
CHAPTER V 
OBSERVATIONS: RECOGNITION OF PROBLEM LOANS 
"...the problem is that banks base their loan 
policy on the assumption that they will be able to 
identify a failing company and extract their loans 
before its asset value falls below the value of 
these loans. It is quite clear that, too often, 
they cannot". 
- John Argenti (1976b, p.185) 
In this chapter, the main observations of the study 
pertaining to problem loan recognition are presented. The 
related issues dealing with the response of the banks will 
be dealt with in the next chapter. It is usually appropriate 
in an empirical research to report the "findings" of the 
study which involves presentation of the results followed by 
a discussion. However, as explained in the previous chapter, 
the present study is exploratory and involves quantitative 
and qualitative components. On some issues the two methods 
supplement and in others they complement each other. The 
intention is to identify relationships and observe patterns, 
not to test hypotheses. Therefore, rather than calling them 
findings, the word "observations" seems more appropriate. 
The sections in this chapter each report a main 
observation and where appropriate, relate quantitative and 
qualitative support, look at it from the institutional 
perspective of the bank and that of the loan officer, and 
discuss its implications. 
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A. Problem Loans and Business Failures 
This section deals with the definition of a problem 
loan from the point of view of a bank and loan officers and 
looks at its links with the notion of business failures. 
1. Definitions 
The banking literature views problem loans in a very 
general manner as any loan in which problems develop which 
adversely affect the bank's liquidity and increase the 
possibility of loss (Reed et al., 1984). In other words, by 
definition, a bank does not make a bad loan, but once a loan 
has been made, problems may develop which create a 
possibility of there being a loss of interest or principal, 
or both. While this could also occur due to the 
unwillingness of the borrower to repay, it is largely due to 
the inability to repay and it is this condition which 
concerns us. 
Banks on their own and as required by regulatory 
authorities, have defined the problem loan, which is also 
referred to as a non-performing loan, in more operational 
terms. When a loan is recognized as having a problem, 
interest may continue to be charged or accrued, even though 
it may not be paid. When interest is no longer being 
charged, it is considered to be in non-accrual status. If 
the interest rate and terms of payment are renegotiated, the 
loan may be on a recovery list but is still considered non¬ 
performing when the renegotiated rate and terms are lower 
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than what would be charged on a new fully performing loan of 
similar status. 
From the point of view of sound banking principles and 
out of concern for public disclosure, the regulatory 
authorities in Canada (Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions), and in the US (Office of the 
Controller of Currency, Federal Reserve Bank, and the state 
banking regulators) further define rules and regulations for 
dealing with problem loans in terms of accounting and 
provision for reserves on the banks' books. 
Non-performing loans and their consequences affect a 
bank’s financial statements in several ways. As interest 
goes unpaid, revenues decline and as loan principal is 
written down, assets decline. Time spent on collection is 
diverted from business development. The effort of collection 
gives rise to other expenses as professionals are employed, 
third party costs incurred, etc. 
2. Loan Officers Responses 
In the questionnaire, an open-ended question 
specifically asked loan officers to "define a problem loan" 
and whether there are standard policies to deal with them. 
A summary of their responses reveals that a problem 
loan is looked upon as one where: 
a. there is a violation of the loan covenants in terms 
of dividends declared, assets acquired, reduction in 
security value, overdrafts, etc. 
b. there is a delinquency, i.e. interest and/or 
principal have not been repaid as per plan, and 
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c. there is a decline in the financial performance of 
the firm revealed through declining ratios, weak cash flow, 
etc. 
Each officer expressed different elements or 
combinations of these items. An analysis of the responses 
between the officers reveals an interesting distinction. 
Some of the loan officers, viewing the problem loan in 
purely financial terms, describe it as, "non-payment of 
interest and principal and violation of covenants", 
"delinquency, low profitability and reduced quality of 
security", "90 days overdue", etc. There are others who look 
at it from a more managerial point of view. They termed a 
problem loan as "any loan whose primary and secondary 
repayment sources are in actual or potential jeopardy", 
"where the client's repayment capacity has been jeopardized 
and/or where quality of underlying security has seriously 
deteriorated", "any account where there are factors 
negatively affecting a company's viability creates an 
atmosphere where an account or loan can be a problem". 
In addition to the above, there is a distinction in 
their responses to the second part of the question regarding 
policies to deal with problem loans. While some feel that 
there are standard policies and guidelines, others recognize 
that "each case is different and you can't rigidly adhere to 
the policies". 
3. Discussion 
At the beginning of the literature review (Chapter II) 
a brief reference was made to research into the causes of 
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decline. Miller (1977) stresses the need to distinguish 
between causes and symptoms of failure and Argenti (1976) 
argues that while the underlying causes lead to failure, 
focusing on and eliminating the symptoms (e.g. through 
financial ratios, cash for paying wages, etc.) may not 
prevent failure. A similar distinction appears in the loan 
officer's view of problem loans. The distinction between 
those who look upon it in purely financial terms and those 
who look upon it in a more managerial fashion is a replica 
of the distinction between looking at the symptoms and 
looking at the causes. Looking at the mechanics of payment 
and delinquency is concentrating on only the symptoms which 
appear at the surface while looking beyond at the health of 
the firm and the ability to pay is examining the causes. 
During discussions with the bank officers, the 
importance of differentiating between the symptoms and the 
underlying problems came through quite clearly since they 
dictate the responses. The implications of this distinction 
will be discussed in a subsequent section. 
B. Distinction Between Decline and Failure 
While discussing the nature of decline in Chapter II, 
the need for distinguishing between decline and failure was 
established. This section reports on the view of the senior 
bankers on this distinction and also discusses the responses 
of the loan officers when asked about it. 
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1. The Rating System 
The distinction between a decline in the financial 
performance of the client and impending failure is made by 
the bank with the help of a rating system. This is a method 
of categorizing the risk of a loan. It is undertaken when 
the loan is first made and a client could move between 
categories depending on the bank's on-going evaluation. The 
objective of the system is to protect banks' exposure and to 
initiate action to reduce exposure and commence turnaround 
of the client through early detection. A commercial bank's 
credit risk rating system is a method of classifying the 
risk of a loan and involves laying down the policy, 
definitions and procedures for guiding a loan 
officer/account manager in his/her credit analysis. The 
regulatory authorities provide broad guidelines for 
classifying risk. Appendix E provides extracts of the 
categories as designated by the regulators in the US and 
Canada. Banks further expand and develop on these guidelines 
to suit their policies. 
The rating system of a bank is considered to be 
confidential information; it is neither exchanged between 
banks nor does a client get to know the rating category of 
his loan. On guaranteeing confidentiality, two banks in 
Canada and three in the US provided the researcher with 
copies of their rating systems. A third bank in Canada 
stated that it does not have one and only uses the broad 
guidelines of the regulatory authorities. The others 
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declined to provide a copy on grounds of confidentiality but 
described their system during interviews. 
The rating systems range from six to nine types of 
classification of the loans. The top rating would be for the 
clients of undoubted standing and the lowest for loans which 
are on non-accrual, where loss of interest and principal is 
expected and which are in the process of bankruptcy or 
liquidation. The rest of the categories are spread along a 
continuum of deteriorating quality. The extent of detail in 
the guidelines varies between banks and some have adapted 
their rating scales to suit particular sectors which 
dominate their operations, such as real estate, retail, etc. 
Appendix F provides extracts of select categories from 
the rating systems of three banks. An analysis shows that 
these banks definitely make a distinction between decline 
and impending failure through their rating systems. In 
accompanying worksheets, each bank provides different 
criteria to enable classification of the loan. The criteria 
of Bank A include review of seven factors to be undertaken 
for a firm: financials, management, industry status, 
security, terms of support, account activity, and competitor 
actions. The criteria of Bank B cover four subject areas: 
management, money, materials, and markets. Each one is 
further broken into 13, 42, 16, and 12 items respectively to 
aid categorization. 
A closer look at the "management" subject area in these 
criteria provides some insights. Though not specified as 
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such in the list, they can be looked upon as covering four 
issues, viz. strategic planning, operations, 
governance, and external reasons. In the case of Bank B, 
some of the items among the 13 listed are: possibility of 
inadequate performance due to lack of management depth in 
principal operating areas, possibility of adverse effect 
from lack of adequate organization structure, planning, 
policies, etc., possibility of change of control, 
possibility cf inadequate labor supply, etc. A similar 
scrutiny of the questions listed under the "management" 
factor in the case of Bank A covers issues of quality, 
competence, depth, and stability. Statements provided in the 
worksheet against which the loan officers evaluate the 
standing of the firm include: lack of clear understanding of 
key leverage points in their business, over-reliance on a 
single product/ customer/ supplier/ market, untimely 
decisions into untried product lines, does management 
project a clear understanding of the financial 
issues/concerns they face, etc. 
Broadly summarizing, the rating systems classify firms 
into categories which fall into three groups: a) good or 
acceptable credit risks, b) non-performing loans still 
believed recoverable, and c) non-accrual loans. There is 
usually a cut-off point where the firms are designated as 
problem loans and carry different rating numbers. Sometimes, 
before actual re-classification into a problem loan 
category, firms are briefly put on a "watch list for closer 
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observation and monitoring. Firms falling into the (b) 
category are believed to be in a stage where the problems 
are not yet severe and there is reasonable expectation of 
turnaround. The firm may or may not be incurring losses at 
this stage and the account may be either current or 
delinquent. Firms falling into the (c) category are the more 
severe cases where the bank is prepared for more drastic 
actions, is getting concerned about the recovery of its 
dues, and is preparing for a loss. Thus, the rating system 
apart from trying to differentiate between the severity of 
the problem, also makes some broad prescriptions about the 
response of the bank by tying the response to the category 
of risk. The significance of this distinction will be 
further developed under the subsequent section on responses. 
The rating system also sometimes specifies the time 
frame for action in each category and specifies where the 
responsibility for further action lies within the bank; 
whether with the loan officer or at specialized functions 
within the bank, and at what stage the transfer to higher 
levels is mandatory. 
2. Response of Loan Officers 
As described above, the rating system is the mechanism 
by which banks classify clients depending on the severity of 
their condition. A description of the system gave an 
indication of how the bank differentiates between decline 
and impending failure and how it distinguishes between the 
severity of the problems facing its clients. This attempt to 
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differentiate between decline and failure was further raised 
in the questionnaire, where loan officers were asked to 
describe the condition of the firm when it was classified as 
a problem loan. Table 5.1 summarizes the responses for US 
and Canada. The percentage of firms considered to be 
suffering from serious but not critical problems when 
classified as a problem loan was 35 among the US firms and 
39 among the Canadian firms. The condition was considered to 
be a crisis threatening the survival of the firm in 56 
percent of the US firms and 40 percent of the Canadian 
firms. 
These responses indicate that, a) while classifying the 
firm as a 'problem loan', the loan officer is able to make a 
distinction in the severity of the problems, b) the rating 
system permits such a distinction to be made, and c) the 
distinction enables a loan officer to differentiate between 
a situation of decline from a situation which threatens the 
survival of the firm. 
During interviews, loan officers and senior bank 
officials agreed very strongly on the need to make the 
distinction between a decline in performance and an 
impending failure. Keeping in mind the bank's primary 
purpose of safeguarding its assets, the officers said that 
the distinction is made by looking at the severity of the 
problem in conjunction with the extent of security coverage 
and the judgement of the loan officer as to the clients 
ability to overcome the problems. This corresponds closely 
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with the distinction between decline and impending failure. 
During a period of decline of financial performance but when 
the situation is still not severe, the existing collateral 
covers the bank's risk. When the severity accelerates, the 
security weakens and increases the exposure of the bank to 
undue risk. 
3. Discussion 
There are a few significant aspects of understanding 
which emerge from the above analysis of the bank's rating 
system and its use. In Section A the meaning of a problem 
loan was discussed and it was shown that loan officers could 
possibly view it either as a pure financial aberration or as 
a managerial problem by looking at the underlying causes for 
the problem. Formal rating systems try to incorporate the 
need to make an in-depth analysis of the firm in order to 
estimate the nature and severity of the problem. By 
providing a structure and set of guidelines, banks try to 
ensure that a loan is analyzed from an overall perspective. 
The use of a rating system is undertaken not only when a 
firm is undergoing problems. It is the basic framework of 
credit rating and analysis which is resorted to when first 
granting the loan to the client. The realization that the 
security and productivity of the loan is closely related to 
the basic health of the enterprise is translated by the bank 
into the monitoring system. As the extracts from the rating 
systems given in the appendix show, the financial condition 
of the firm can be satisfactory but it can still be 
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considered a problem loan if there are other indications of 
potential risk. 
The nature of credit risk analysis very closely 
resembles that of a strategic analysis of the firm. The 
components of the formalized systems examined above cover 
short-term and long-term aspects and transcend various 
functional areas. This is similar to the analysis 
recommended as an on-going activity for a firm from a 
strategic management perspective. For instance, Bank A, in 
the introduction to its guidelines, instructs loan officers 
that "the basic objective in the assessment process is to 
risk rate the borrower and not each facility although it is 
recognized situations do exist where individual credit 
segments of the same borrower carry different quality 
ratings". Thus, the loan officer is advised to view the firm 
as an overall entity and not just evaluate one segment, 
while undertaking the rating process. 
It is important to note that the rating system 
incorporates financial and non-financial characteristics. 
There are areas which are judgmental (e.g. management), 
making it a very subjective process. In trying to recognize 
a problem loan early, categories in the rating system take 
account of the fact that it is potential risk that is being 
estimated. Even if the account is current (i.e. not 
delinquent) and there are no losses, there could be cause to 
indicate a potential risk. Thus, the 'watch list’ and the 
initial problem loan categories attempt to identify a 
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problem loan and thereby a business failure at its incipient 
stages. 
The extent of detail in the risk rating system of each 
bank would vary. One large bank in Canada follows the more 
generalized guidelines of the regulatory authorities and 
permits more latitude to the loan officers in classifying 
and reporting on their problem loans. They believe that a 
detailed rating system tends to make them risk averse. Other 
rating systems which were available reveal the same 
distinctions and basic premises as the one outlined above 
but in a less elaborate manner. The rating systems appear to 
go through their phase of evolution depending on the size of 
the bank, the frequency and extent of problem loans, the 
extent of automation within the bank, and the banks 
philosophy towards problem loans. 
One of the research objectives stated in Chapter III 
was to see if banks made the distinction between decline and 
impending failure and the process by which it was made. This 
has been established in this section by describing the 
rating system and its application. 
Several authors (Argenti, 1976; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 
1988; Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989) have described stages of 
decline and different trajectories of decline which were 
reviewed earlier. The approach of distinguishing between 
different stages of decline finds strong support when viewed 
at from the perspective of the bank too. 
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C. Recognition of the Pi obiem 
The previous section described the rating system of 
categorization as an early means of recognizing a business 
failure. Empirical researchers who have developed models for 
prediction of failure have relied almost exclusively on 
accounting ratios and financial trends (Altman, 1983) . A 
bank's system of classification based as it is on not only 
trend analysis of financial indicators but on other 
strategic and operational factors too can be looked upon as 
an additional important index available to the firm. In this 
section, the further role of the bank as an early trigger 
for recognition is discussed, as also the role of the loan 
officer and the cues used for recognition. 
1. The Importance of Recognition 
An early recognition of a problem loan is considered to 
be an important issue in a bank's credit policy and loan 
monitoring system. A Senior Vice President of a Canadian 
bank referred to a recent letter issued to senior lending 
officers in which they were told that "to have a problem 
loan is not a sin but not to recognize it is unforgivable". 
Banking lore reiterates that "Nobody makes a bad loan; it's 
a good loan that goes bad". While this may be questionable 
(some bankers did admit to a small fraction of the bad loans 
being due to over-zealousness on the part of the bank) 
bankers realize that in the course of normal business, 
problem loans do occur. Lack of problem loans could even 
indicate an excessively conservative approach to lending and 
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missed business opportunities. What is important for the 
bank is to be able to identify early enough a loan turning 
bad and fixing it. 
Banks attempt to pick up the signals of a problem loan 
through an ongoing analyis of the financial and operating 
activities of the company, evaluation of the management, and 
an awareness of the environment. In this function, the 
lending officer is looked upon as the first line of defense, 
and an important link between the bank and the client firm. 
2. Recognition by the Loan Officer 
The onus is primarily on the loan officer (called 
account manager in some banks) to warn the bank of potential 
problems with loans. The rating system discussed earlier is 
only a set of guidelines; its implementation and 
interpretation is left to the loan officer along with 
appropriate supervision. Most of the categories in the 
rating system also call for considerable subjective 
judgement on the part of the loan officer. 
In the course of interviews with loan officers, they 
mentioned that the financial reports received from the 
clients were important but only a subset of the cues used to 
identify a problem loan. They rely on field visits, market 
reports, etc., a mixture of financial and non-financial 
indicators. To better understand the indicators of a 
problem loan, the questionnaire specifically asked the loan 
officers "what were the main cues used to identify this 
client as a problem loan". They rated the cues on a 5-point 
72 
interval scale ranging from 1 (very important) to 5 
(unimportant). Table 5.2 lists the 18 cues along with the 
mean and standard deviation for the US and Canadian samples. 
The correlation among the cues are reported in Tables 5.3 
and 5.4 for US and Canada respectively. Tables 5.3a and 5.4a 
adapt the same information to highlight the significant 
values. 
Judging by the mean values, 'declining profit trends' 
and 'inadequate cash flow' are considered the iriost important 
among all the cues in both the samples. However, testing the 
difference between the two samples using a t-test, 
'declining profits trend' is considered significantly higher 
in the US than in Canada (p<.05). The other variables on 
which significant differences are observed include 
'occurrence of overdrafts' (more important in Canada, 
p<.01), and 'delinquency or slow loan payments' (more 
important in the US, p<.05). 
It is interesting that delinquency is relatively less 
important than declining profit trend and inadequate cash 
flow as a cue. In banking terminology, problem loans are 
often defined using delinquency of 30, 60, or 90 days as 
cut-off points for re-classification of the loan. When asked 
to define a problem loan, loan officers had frequently 
included delinquency as one of the characteristics. However, 
in rating it lower as a cue, loan officers are recognizing 
the fact that inadequate cash flow and declining profit 
trends can occur before a loan becomes overdue. By looking 
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at other indicators loan officers obtain earlier signals for 
identifying a problem loan before another 
function/department within the bank, such as loan review or 
the credit department, which would pick up the signals 
through the internal information systems which monitor 
delinquency, overdrafts, and security coverage. 
The low importance of 'audit report qualification’ can 
be explained by the fact that as almost all the firms were 
small to medium in size, they may not have regular external 
audit checks. 
Some of the other financial indicators such as 
'deteriorating receivables', 'inventory turnover’, and 
'extended trade payables' while being correlated (Tables 5.3 
and 5.4) are rated lower in importance than the more 
straightforward indicators such as 'deviation of performance 
from plan’ and 'declining sales trends'. The lower 
importance of certain management changes such as 'changes in 
accountants’ and 'changes in executives/ stockholders' 
differs from the view held in the literature that management 
turnover is an early indicator in the decline phase. The 
reason for this could again be that given the small to 
medium size of the firms, these cues do not appear as 
significant. 
'Declining profits trend', an obvious warning signal 
also used in failure prediction models, is strongly 
correlated with 'financial ratios' and 'inadequate cash 
flow’. The 'occurrence of overdrafts', more important in 
Canada, also shows strong correlation with operational cues 
such as poor cash flow, payable/receivable problems, and 
delayed submission of statements to the bank. 
Loan officers mentioned during interviews that 'delayed 
receipt of statements’ and 'reluctance to share information 
with the bank’ are events which occur frequently when the 
firm is in difficulty. They, however, do not appear to be 
very important cues on their own and would be effective only 
in conjunction with others. 
3. Other Related Issues 
Some of the other issues which emerged during the 
interviews in connection with the role loan officers play in 
recognition of problem loans are noteworthy. 
a. Loan Officer - Client Relations. The Canadian 
bankers mentioned that due to the branch banking system, 
there was a tendency to transfer loan officers between 
branches, every three to five years. With more limited 
dispersal of operations in the US system, transfer is a rare 
occurence. This results in loan officers staying with a 
given portfolio much longer in the US than in Canada. The 
repercussions for loan recognition are that often loan 
officers in the US can get to know their clients better and 
have longer term relations with them than Canadian officers. 
In analyzing the rating systems of the banks, it appears 
that the Canadian banks apparently have more elaborate 
systems for recognizing problem loans than the American 
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banks. It is possible that this could partly compensate for 
the more frequent personnel transfers in Canada. 
A risk in establishing long-term relations with the 
client is seen by the banks as getting too close to them and 
identifying with the client rather than with the bank. This 
view was expressed both by senior officials and loan 
officers. Loan officers feel the need to maintain a distance 
to be able to take a dispassionate view. However, 
understanding the client closely is viewed by one loan 
officer as helping to "avoid your problems by being in the 
front end of the train [rather] than the back end. It takes 
five years to get that close to a client. And that's when 
you really start contributing to that business..then you get 
involved in their succession planning". While loan officers 
are expected to be close to their clients from a business 
development perspective, it is viewed as a disqualification 
when the client turns into a problem loan. Resolution of 
this conflict is sometimes achieved through supervision of 
the loan officer and described under paragraph (d) below. 
b. Age and Experience. Senior officials of the banks 
mentioned that increasingly younger individuals with more 
academic qualification than experience are occupying 
positions as loan officers. Their judgement is that this 
tends to make the officers more reliant on reports and 
financial information, and lowers their credibility in the 
eyes of the client in accepting the loan officers' 
suggestions and concerns. The profile of the loan officers 
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in this study does not show any difference between the two 
samples in years of experience or number of problem loans 
handled (Table 4.1). 
c. Supervision and Support Systems. To take into 
account the need for supervision of the loan officers 
efforts at recognition, banks develop checks and support 
systems. The bank's systems and procedures stipulate trip¬ 
wires to aid early recognition and provide a fail-back. The 
methods include: 
i) Having rating systems which provide for mandatory 
re-classifications at various levels of deterioration. While 
there is still an element of judgement with the loan 
officer, depending on the extent of delinquency or a time 
frame from initial identification, mandatory re¬ 
classifications of the problem loan to higher risk 
categories are provided. 
ii) Handing over of the account to the workout 
department at a cut-off point in the classification 
sequence. Beyond a stage in the rating sequence, some banks 
require the loan officer to withdraw from primary decision 
making on the handling of the problem loan which is taken 
over by senior levels in the hierarchy, or specialized 
departments such as workout or loan review. 
iii) Requiring reports from the loan officer on action 
taken even prior to re-classification and specifying a time 
period within which improvement would take place. Even while 
holding exclusive charge, the loan officer may be required 
to justify to the supervisory function the steps being taken 
to workout the problem and why re-classification is not yet 
required. 
iv) Independent scrutiny by other departments within 
the bank. Other departments such as loan review, credit, 
etc. scrutinize overdrafts, covenant violations, and 
delinquency and could initiate a request to the concerned 
loan officer to justify the current rating. 
Loan officers too recognize this pressure and realize 
that there is a supervision of the problem loan recognition 
process. 
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4. Recognition by the Client and Use of Shocks 
While in a predominant number of cases the bank was the 
first to raise the concern about declining performance with 
the client, in a small number of cases (6% in the US and 
12.6% in Canada) the officers reported that the client 
recognized his problems first and voluntarily notified the 
bank. In 32 percent of the cases in both the US and Canada 
there was an initial denial by the client when the bank 
revealed its concern. During interviews too the officers 
remarked that an initial denial by the client is common. 
The process model on recognition in Chapter III 
described the possibility of the banks "precipitating" a 
crisis in the firm by using its financial leverage to shock 
the client into seeing its point of view. A question 
addressed to the loan officers asked whether the bank had to 
'shock the client into recognizing the situation as a crisis 
(e.g. additional credit being made conditional to changes, 
etc.)'. In 47.1 percent of the cases in the US and 51 
percent of the cases in Canada, the loan officers answered 
'yes'. This, in a way, supports the commonly held view in 
the literature that incumbent management often denies the 
existence of a problem until the situation deteriorates to a 
point when it is either obvious or management is forced to 
admit that the problem is more severe than previously 
believed. One senior bank official remarked, "..a lot of the 
clients are not prepared to accept that they have a 
problem....when we look at a situation and think the 
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business is deteriorating, the first way out as far as I'm 
concerned is to tell the fellow he has got a serious problem 
and if he doesn't agree with you to tell him he has got to 
find another financier." 
When the responses on recognition and the need for 
shock are tabulated jointly (Table 5.5) the picture shows 
that where there is acceptance by the client there is less 
of a need to shock in both the samples. Even when there is 
acceptance, the need to shock could arise because of the 
close connection between recognition and response to the 
problem. Vfhile they are being treated separately here for 
the purpose of discussion, the bank would expect to see 
action simultaneous with an admission of problems. 
Therefore, the need to 'shock' the client does not have an 
exact correspondence with initial acceptance or denial of 
the problems. 
5. Discussion 
Experimental studies have been conducted in the 
accounting field (Libby, 1975; Abdel-Khalik and El-Sheshai, 
1980; Casey, 1980) to examine the ability of bank loan 
officers to predict corporate failure using financial 
ratios. Libby found that bank loan officers used financial 
ratios to predict corporate failure for sample firms with 74 
percent accuracy. However, Casey, in replicating Libby's 
study with slight variations in design, found that the 
ability of loan officers to predict corporate failure 
accurately based on accounting ratios alone may not be 
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generalizable. This view was further extended in the Abdel- 
Khalik and El-Sheshai study which concluded that loan 
officers performed worse than the mechanical failure 
prediction models used to generate various benchmarks to aid 
prediction. 
The data in the current study point to reasons for the 
weakness in the conclusions of the above experiments. It 
seems quite clear that the loan officers depend on several 
cues to identify a problem and not accounting or financial 
ratios alone. Keasey and Watson (1987) in a study using data 
on 73 failed and 73 non-failed companies argue that 
marginally better predictions concerning small company 
failure may be obtained from non-financial data as compared 
to those which can be achieved from using traditional 
financial ratios. While the financial ratios are a 
significant element in the information processing model of 
the loan officers, they are used in combination with non- 
financial and operating indicators such as declining sales 
trend, occurrence of overdrafts, etc. Moreover, the 
objective of the accounting studies has been to arrive at a 
'yes/no' decision of the possibility of failure or 
bankruptcy. This is not the way loan officers operate. While 
one of the main considerations of the officers is to 
estimate the ultimate threat to the security of the banks 
funds at risk, they are able to distinguish between levels 
of severity of the problem facing the client. Hence the 
process is a dynamic one and should be borne in mind while 
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estimating static data. Once the emerging problem is 
identified, different combinations of these cues would be 
used at different points of time for the same firm to arrive 
at varying estimates of the severity of the problem. They 
are not sequential indicators. 
This chapter further establishes the important role of 
the bank as an external trigger for the recognition of the 
problem in a client. When there is a denial on the part of 
the client, the bank is not above resorting to shocks to 
bring about the recognition by making it conditional for 
further assistance or using the threat of withdrawal from 
the relationship. The importance of this role is derived 
from the close correspondence between the interests of the 
firm and that of the bank in the event of early recognition. 
On the face of it, the figures in Table 5.1 could be 
interpreted to mean that in 56 percent of the firms in the 
US and 40 percent in Canada, the problems were not 
recognized early enough but only when they threatened the 
survival of the firm. However, this interpretation would be 
misleading because, as would be shown subsequently, the loan 
officers do not classify a firm as a problem loan 
immediately on suspicion of a problem. There is a lag in 
classification. Moreover, since not all firms deteriorate 
gradually, there could be a rapid movement into failure soon 
after identification. 
Just as an early recognition of the problems of a firm 
can lead to easier and more successful turnaround efforts. 
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the bank's interest in early recognition stems from its 
concern for the safety of its assets from a long term point 
of view. Although financially a loan may be secured 
sufficiently for a bank not to have serious concerns, the 
possibility of deterioration affecting the security is 
sufficient cause for the bank's interest in an early 
recognition. 
The next chapter will extend this discussion of problem 
loan recognition by incorporating the issues pertaining to 
the response strategies of the banks. 
Table 5.1 
Condition of Firms When 
Classified as a Problem Loan 
Item U.S 
% 
Canada 
% 
Problems were of a temporary 
nature which could be tackled 8.8 21.4 
Problems were serious causing 
a decline in financial perfor¬ 
mance but not critical 35.3 38.6 
The firm was in a crisis which 
threatened its survival 55.9 • 40.0 
Total 100 100 
Table 5.2 
Cues Used to Identify a Problem Loan 
ITEM US Canada 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. t 
1. Analysis of financial ratios 2.32 1.22 2.31 1.3 
2. Deviation of performance 2.65 1.33 2.47 1.31 
from plan 
3. Declining sales trend 2.75 1.48 2.54 1.44 
4. Declining profits trend 1.27 0.76 1.61 1.04 * 
5. Inadequate cash flow 1.56 1.13 1.51 0.83 
6. Deteriorating receivables 3.12 1.6 3.13 1.52 
7. Slow inventory turnover 3.19 1.4 3.27 1.51 
8. Extended trade payables 2.69 1.42 2.78 1.37 
9. Change in accountants 4.07 1.11 4.4 1.02 
10. Change in key stockhold- 3.87 1.41 4.15 1.38 
ers and executives 
11. Credit inquiries from trade 3.97 1.05 3.88 1.23 
12. Problems of the industry 3.19 1.42 3.43 1.47 
13. Personal factors 3.81 1.49 4.31 1.23 
14. Delayed submission of fi- 2.58 1.35 3.07 1.52 
nancial statements 
15. Reluctance to share infor- 3.13 1.59 3.22 1.55 
mation with the bank 
16. Occurrence of overdrafts 3.5 1.65 2.51 1.59 
** 
17. Delinquent or slow pay- 2.53 1.7 3.27 1.68 
* 
ments 
18. Qualification in the audit 4.23 1.22 4.21 1.2 
report 
* p < 5 
** p< .01 
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TABLE 5.5 
Recognition: Acceptance or 
Denial and Use of Shock 
ITEM US (%) Canada (%) 
Had to shock Row 
Total 
Had to shock Row 
Total Yes No Yes No 
Acceptance by client 28.6 71.4 61.8 35.4 64.6 55.2 
Denial by client 90.9 9.1 32.4 91 3 8.7 32.2 
Client initiates 0 100 5.9 16.7 83.3 12.6 
Total 47.1 52.9 100 51.0 49.0 100 
CHAPTER VI 
OBSERVATIONS: RESPONSE 
"The trigger for change during a severe crisis is 
more likely to be an intervention from an outside 
source, most commonly banks or lending 
institutions, than management itself." 
Stuart Slatter (1984, p.75) 
The previous chapter examined issues connected with a 
bank recognizing a business failure and triggering that 
recognition in the client through its approach of 
identifying*a problem loan. A simultaneous activity for a 
bank, along with recognition, is responding to the problem 
loan. In this chapter, the array of possible responses of 
the bank are presented, these are related to the causes of 
decline in the firm, and a model is put together to explain 
the response strategies. 
A. Response of the Bank 
The process of recognition explained in the previous 
chapter is further extended in this section in relation to 
the response of the loan officer and the bank to the problem 
loan. 
1. The Process of Response 
The objective of the bank in responding to a problem 
loan is what the senior bank officials often describe as 
"enlightened self-interest". At policy making levels, the 
bankers unanimously believe that the workout of a problem 
loan is preferable to forcing a liquidation. By 'workout' is 
meant the efforts of a bank in working with the client to 
overcome the problems with the loan. Thus, it is a part of 
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the turnaround strategy of the firm approached froir the 
banks perspective. In the words of one banker, "we'd rather 
create survivors than casualties". Moreover, one Vice 
President remarked that "it is far more efficient 
financially and from a public relations point of view to 
help a client turn the corner than basically try and 
liquidate them". 
The rating systems used by the bank for recognition of 
a problem loan sometimes build-in response strategies. One 
bank in Canada has a chart of 15 codes designating different 
alternatives or stages in their response to the problem. 
These include liquidation, debt restructuring with or 
without concessions, etc. They are all financial in nature 
and are codes that the bank attaches to its credit risk 
rating code to signify the response strategy being followed 
at each stage of the problem loan. Linking the response 
objectives with early recognition, another Canadian bank, in 
a handout to loan officers describing their Risk Assessment 
Process says, "Clearly, our ability to either reduce 
exposure, or work with a customer successfully to achieve a 
turnaround is greatly enhanced by early detection of account 
deterioration". 
Generally, recognizing that each situation is 
different, banks attempt to build systems and lay down 
policies as broad guidelines, while monitoring progress 
individually within the bank. There is an on-going debate in 
the banking circles about the most appropriate method or 
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dealing with the problem loans. There are two broad 
alternatives: one is to leave the response and workout 
efforts with the loan officer, and the other is to have a 
specialized loan workout function within the bank. Banks 
sometimes try out one approach after the other, and one sees 
both small and large banks following either approaches or 
combinations of the two. 
The arguments, briefly, for and against either 
approaches are as below. In favor of letting the lending 
officer handle the workout is the belief that, a) the 
lending officer is responsible for making the loan and 
therefore should be responsible for cleaning the mess, b) 
he/she best understands the client's needs, and c) it is a 
part of the learning experience and helps the loan officer 
to avoid similar problems in other situations. In favor of 
setting up specialized departments for workout are, a) the 
lending officer is too close to the client to be able to 
view the problem objectively, b) there is a need for 
specialized expertise to handle workout, and c) it takes too 
much of the time of a lending officer affecting other areas 
of his/her operations. 
Some banks have moved from relying on a lending officer 
exclusively to setting up workout departments, as they have 
grown and as the quantum of problem loans handled have 
increased. Others have set up specialized workout teams when 
the problems in one particular industry worsen and then 
disband the groups as the situation improves. Most adopt a 
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combination of the two approaches by relying on the loan 
officer in the early stages of the problem, and then 
transferring the loan to a workout department depending on 
the time already taken on the loan, extent of severity of 
the decline, extent of the banks exposure, etc. Two of the 
banks had a time limit of six months after which, if the 
problems are either not resolved or are not progressing 
satisfactorily, the account's transfer to the workout 
department is randatorv. Even while the loan is being 
handled by the loan officer, regular progress reports are 
required within the bank wherein the loan officer would have 
to justify the strategy for resolution that is being 
followed and cosrsit himself to a timetable. 
The loan officers were asked about their position in 
the workout process at the time of responding to the 
questions. Table 6.1 summarizes the results. In 91.2 percent 
of the US cases and 87.6 percent of the Canadian cases the 
loan officer is handling the problem loan with or without 
the assistance of other departments. Even within this, the 
bulk of the cases are being handled exclusively by the loan 
officer with a significantly higher percentage in Canada 
than in the US (71% and 50% respectively). In 2.9 percent of 
the US cases and 4.1% of the Canadian cases the loan had 
been transferred to the workout department. However, even in 
those situations where the loan is transferred to the 
workout function, the loan officer is often kept in the 
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picture as the administrative conduit for liaison and 
information though decision making doer, not rest with her. 
In responding to a problem loan, some banks expressed 
concern about the need to resist the temptation to advise 
the clients on how to run their business. Senior officials 
and loan officers often hastened to add that while their 
function required them to alert the client and the bank to 
potential problems, they constantly have to bear in mind 
that they are not the experts in running the firm. "We are 
not financial advisers," said one. "The idea of small branch 
managers counselling people I find quite ludicrous. Most of 
us have a tough time with our own." Another senior official 
remarked, "We don't really feel ourselves especially 
competent to say to a customer that he should broaden his 
product line. We can only say we perceive a problem and he 
should seek specialized help." Another officer, head of the 
Workout Department, related his bank's approach to workout 
as, "What we try to do is to get the company to help itself 
by trying to position them to recognize deficiencies. We try 
to create self-awareness." However, at the leveT of the loan 
officer, it does appear to be difficult to maintain the 
distinction between serving as a warning bell and being an 
adviser or a manager. Many loan officers talked about trying 
not to be too closely involved, but while giving specific 
examples to illustrate a point, one could see that they 
often do advise or get drawn in, however obliquely. This is 
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also observed in their responses as to how they visualize 
their role, which is presented in the next section. 
Just as the onus for identification of a problem loan 
rests with the loan officers, so also does the initial 
response. An analysis of the discussions with the bankers 
actually reveals that it is more meaningful to talk about 
levels of responses rather than the response of the bank. 
One senior official remarked that the bank's objective as an 
institution which is expected to be followed by the 
impersonal workout department is capital preservation while 
that of a loan officer also involves preservation of a 
relationship. Moreover, the graded rating system results in 
the firm being at a more severe stage of decline when the 
account is transferred to the workout department. This has 
corresponding implications for recovery of funds and will, 
in itself, dictate variations in the response of the bank. 
Thus, it is important to examine the response of the loan 
officer more closely and differentiate it from the bank's 
response. 
2. Loan Officer's Response 
The loan officers response to the problem loan is 
examined in terms of their objectives, the distinction 
between decline and failure, and the lags in classification. 
a. Objectives. The loan officers see their objective in 
a problem loan situation as trying to help the client while 
protecting the bank's interest. The responses to the 
question, "In addition to your primary objective in 
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protecting the bank's funds, do you visualize your role as 
including the following" are listed in Table 6.2. The 
officers in the US and Canada consider it as 'very 
important' their role to provide an early warning to a firm 
of an impending crisis (90.5% and 82.1%, US and Candian 
officers respectively), and to help the client, to the 
extent possible, in overcoming the problems (82.6% and 78.8% 
in the US and Canada respectively). Almost all of the 
remaining felt it is 'somewhat important' to do so. Except 
for an insignificant number in the Canadian sample, nobody 
thought it is 'unimportant'. 
Apart from the above, loan officers were asked if there 
were any other roles they visualize. Judging from the 
response, many of them visualize their roles as being more 
active than their bank's policies would expect them to be. 
Some of the comments are: "improve management of 
operations", "provide financial advise", "assist client in 
considering possible complimentary areas of 
diversification", "identify with the client the potential 
sources of difficulty and the possible solutions", "analyze 
and recommend actions to take", etc. In addition to the 
immediate financial and operating interests of the client 
firms, some of the officers felt it important that they 
"protect trade creditors", "protect guarantors and 
investors", etc. This supports our argument in the previous 
section that while banks would ideally like to play a 
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limited and distanced role, the loan officers see themselves 
in a more active light. 
b. Decline vs Failure. An open-ended question queried 
the loan officers whether they "distinguish between decline 
in the financial performance of the firm (including losses) 
and the client's survival being threatened", in formulating 
their response to the problem loan. The answer was 
overwhelmingly in the affirmative. In clarifying how the 
distinction is made, some very interesting views and 
patterns emerged. 
Only a very few view the distinction in purely 
financial terms, such as the "ability to absorb the impact 
of loss via equity", or "the stability of the balance 
sheet". The majority of the responses include one or more of 
the following types of comments as helping to distinguish 
between decline and impending failure: 
i. The degree and severity of the decline or negative 
developments need to be considered. If the decline is- 
significant and on going, survival can be threatened. 
ii. Loss is only the symptom and not the problem. 
Losses or negative financial performance do not 
necessarily mean the company is in trouble. Magnitude 
of the losses in terms of long term viability needs to 
be evaluated. 
iii. The causes for the decline and the potential for 
improvement needs to be evaluated. It needs to be 
determined whether management or external reasons like 
market, or events beyond their control are causing the 
decline. 
iv. The risk rating system helps to distinguish between 
a loan which may be a problem loan but survival is not 
questioned and the next category where survival is 
questionable and the loan needs to be restructured. 
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v. Managements' ability to control and turnaround the 
problems. Good management can turn it around. 
Managements' understanding of the problems and the 
actions taken are key. 
The above represents a grouping of the kinds of 
comments made by the loan officers and reveals that just as 
in the definition of a problem loan, many view their 
response as going beyond financial reasons and strategies. 
As required by the bank rating systems, officers are able to 
look beyond the immediate problems and perceive a difference 
between symptoms and causes of the problem and the 
managerial aspects of the crisis. 
c. Criteria for Responses. During discussions, the loan 
officers frequently expanded on their role in handling a 
problem loan and referred to elements of the situation which 
influence their response. 
The primary element that loan officers frequently say 
they look for is the extent of trust or cooperation 
exhibited by the client. Is the firm being honest and open, 
or trying to conceal information? As one loan officer put 
it, "If you are going to go through bad times with somebody, 
you've got to really trust them...so I would tend to tighten 
up based on a character reading very quickly on our 
controls. Whereas, if somebody is very forthright and up¬ 
front, I'll give him a longer leash. Knowing they are going 
to tell me before when I'm in trouble." While most often the 
initial reaction of the firm is to deny a problem, as noted 
earlier, subsequently there is a fair amount of 
acquiescence. In situations where the client voluntarily 
98 
recognizes the problem and approaches the bank with the 
information about impending problems and a tentative action 
plan, the officers feel that they are more accommodating 
than if they have to indulge in arm-twisting to get the 
client to act. 
Very similar to this issue of first being able to trust 
the management is the judgement of the management's ability 
to turnaround the firm. The question of judging management 
and how rating systems approach it was commented upon in the 
earlier chapter discussing recognition. Admitting that it is 
a very subjective decision, banks evaluate the 
plans/strategy of the firm to turnaround, along with their 
confidence in the management's ability to achieve the 
results. As the Executive Vice President of a large Canadian 
bank said bluntly, "It is an arbitrary judgement which we 
have to make whether we restructure and go on or we 
liquidate. And it is fundamentally a judgement on 
management." 
Trying to shock the client into recognizing his 
problems was mentioned earlier. By extension, banks resort 
to this approach also to influence the client into taking 
action. Measures such as refusing a line of credit, asking 
the client to find another banker, shifting the loan from 
the loan officer to a workout department, etc. are ways of 
prodding the client along a path acceptable to the bank. 
d. Lags in Classification. In order to judge the nature 
of any lags in the process of classification, the loan 
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officers were asked to estimate the time taken, i) between 
when the problem was identified and the firm classified as a 
problem loan, and ii) between when the problem was 
identified and the client informed of the banks concern 
(Table 6.3). While there is a lag of about 11 weeks between 
identification and classification, it is only about 3 to 4 
weeks before the client is informed of the banks concern. 
The difference between the two, namely, about 7 to 8 weeks 
can be interpreted as the period when the loan officer is 
bringing about the recognition and is simultaneously 
influencing the client to respond with an appropriate plan. 
This occurs even before the bank "officially" steps in with 
a change in the risk classification and would be a very 
early warning to a client firm. 
The lag in classification lends further credence to the 
belief that the response of the bank can be seen to operate 
at two levels. The loan officer on whom the bank depends for 
early recognition of a problem loan has a first attempt at 
assisting the client to recognize the problem and initiate 
attempts at turnaround. Due to established links, he/she is 
able to advise and assist, and sees his/her role in a larger 
light than the bank's official role would prescribe. If 
these attempts do not succeed, or even if they are in the 
process of resolution, the procedure works to get the loan 
re-classified onto a higher risk rating. This would trigger 
further safeguards from the bank's point of view and give 
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the loan the necessary status for more concerted effort from 
the bank at an institutional level. 
3. Response Variables and Strategies 
In order to understand the array of responses available 
for use by the loan officer, they were asked to designate, 
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (under active 
consideration/implementation) to 5 (will not be considered), 
the status of 22 possible types of intervention for the 
specific problem loans being reported on. The variables are 
listed in Table 6.4 along with their mean and standard 
deviation. 
Among the response variables, those more likely to be 
considered or resorted to are ’seeking additional collateral 
for existing loans’, seeking guarantees in addition to 
existing collateral’, time extension of the due date of the 
debt', recommend additional capitalization’, recommend 
downsizing business/asset divestment’, suggest improvements 
in operations/cost reductions’, and recall of loan’. 
A comparison of the means shows that some of the 
options such as ’part forgiveness of the loan’, sale of 
loan', settle out of court with interest and principal 
loss’, and ’exchange of debt for equity’ are not usually 
active options. While banking literature considers part 
forgiveness as an option, like settling out of court, some 
of these responses would perhaps he considered at later 
stages in the workout process; it must be borne in mind that 
these are being considered by the loan officer on behalf of 
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the bank while he/she is still handling the loan. While sale 
of the loan to another bank is mentioned in the banking 
literature as an option and is also specifically considered 
in the rating system of one bank, loan officers admitted to 
the difficulty of using it since it is difficult to time the 
sale such that the loan would still be attractive to another 
bank. Exchanging debt for equity is an option used more 
readily in the case of large publicly traded firms and not 
for the size of firms being reported on here, and is again a 
decision taken at higher levels and at later stages of the 
workout. 
Bankers at different levels mentioned during the 
interviews that due to concerns of lender liability, they 
are reluctant to initiate a change in management or act in a 
manner that could be interpreted as exercising control over 
the client. However, they do make suggestions and indirect 
recommendations, often working through a consultant. One 
senior vice-president in charge of workout commented, 
■Indirectly you suggest a plan and alternatives. You would 
always make it clear that the client was making the 
decision." The loan officers, working at a more informal 
level in the initial stages, are less inhibited in their 
actions. 
It is important to mention here that these response 
variables are not strictly alternatives but are often viewed 
as concurrent or sequential measures. The sca.e measuring 
the replies were designed to take this characteristic in ~o 
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account with the choice being labeled as 'likely to be 
considered/resorted to’, 'neutral-may or may not be 
considered', etc. This has a bearing particularly in the 
subsequent analyses in which these variables are to be used. 
Significant differences between the US and Canadian 
samples exist in three variables. While the US loan officers 
are more inclined to granting extension of time on the due 
date of the debt, they are also more inclined to recover the 
money through legal measures. There are also differences on 
sale of the loan as a strategy, but the mean of the variable 
does not make it an important one for consideration. The two 
samples had differing correlation structures, which are 
reported in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 for US and Canada 
respectively. (Tables 6.5a and 6.6a highlight the 
significant correlations for US and Canada respectively.) 
Seeking additional collateral as a response correlates 
well with requiring additional capitalization, recommending 
downsizing, and recommending merger/sale of the unit in 
Canada but not in the US. Granting of additional loans, 
though, correlates well with additional capitalization and 
suggesting improvements in operations in both samples. 
Granting extension of time, which has more importance in the 
US than in Canada, correlates well with recommending a 
consultant in the US but not in Canada. Generally, in the 
Canadian sample, the managerial responses such as 
recommending consultants, recommending management changes. 
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and systems improvements correlates stiongly with each other 
as against the US sample. 
Thus, the Canadian loan officers appear more willing to 
use consultants along with other approaches and seem to have 
a broader span of managerial responses as part of their 
package than the US officers, especially managerial changes. 
Even in the case of financial strategies, the Canadian loan 
officers, in addition to additional collateral and 
guarantees go in for additional capitalization, and 
structural changes such as downsizing and mergers. 
In order to examine if these variables group along 
definite factors, a factor analysis (principal components 
using Kaiser normalization) was performed with varimax 
rotation. The results for the US and Canadian samples are 
listed under Tables 6.7 and 6.8 respectively. 
Seven factors emerged in each of the samples explaining 
79 percent of the variance in the US and 69.3 percent in the 
Canadian cases. The factor loadings are strong. It is 
interesting that the most important factors explaining 22 
percent and 24.3 percent in the Canadian and US"samples 
respectively are workout related variables. This supports 
the views expressed by the officers that their first 
preference is always for a workout. Studying the first 
factor in each sample, the Canadian factor is seen to be 
managerial in its approach involving managerial and strategy 
changes, systems and operations improvements, and 
recommending a consultant. The US factor is more financial 
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with a bias towards reducing exposure. Apart from 
recommending change in strategies and improvement in 
operations, the factor includes requiring additional 
capitalization and granting additional loans. 
The second dominating response strategy in both the 
samples is largely one of legal recovery measures explaining 
17.6 percent and 14.9 percent of the variance in the US and 
Canadian samples respectively. These two factors spanning 
. workout and legal recovery strategies together explain about 
37 and 42 percent of the variance respectively for Canada 
and the US. 
The remaining five strategies in each of the samples 
explain smaller percentages of the variance and a few do not 
have strong Alpha's. They include both workout and 
withdrawal strategies. While managerial changes combined 
with the first workout factor in the Canadian sample, it 
emerged as a separate factor in the US sample (7.6% of the 
variance). Some of the smaller factors, while explaining 
only a small part of the variance, had strong loadings and 
represented distinct strategies. Workout with long-term 
commitments got split into two factors in the US sample 
although the variables could conceptually combine as one 
factor. In the Canadian sample, the strategy named 'exit 
with loss’ (with strong loadings and explaining 8.5% of the 
variance) need not be only related to exit but could also 
represent a long-term commitment. Thus, some of the smaller 
factors are not conceptually very clear to interpret. 
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Three of the response variables, namely part 
forgiveness of the loan, sale of the loan, and exchanging 
debt for equity did not appear to be serious options (based 
on their means). They were excluded and the factor analysis 
performed again. However, the explanatory power of the 
factors did not improve substantially and the overall 
percentage of variance explained by the six new factors 
which emerged was slightly lower than that of the original 
factors. They are, therefore, not considered. 
The various elements influencing these responses will 
now be discussed in the next section before relating the 
response strategies to the causes for the decline. 
4. Elements Influencing the Response 
The loan officer while representing the bank’s 
interests begins to face possible conflicts in formulating a 
response strategy. While the primary objective would be to 
protect the banks funds at risk, the loan officer would also 
like to help the client turnaround, want to retain the 
client given competitive market conditions, bear in mind 
lender liability concerns, etc. 
In order to understand more clearly the different 
considerations influencing the response of the bank, the 
loan officers were asked to identify 14 variables on a 5- 
point scale ranging fros 1 (very important) to 5 
(unimportant). Table 6.9 lists the variables and their mean 
and standard deviation for the US anc Canadian sasples. 
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Strongly Identifying with the institutional objectives, 
protection of the bank's funds at risk’ is the most 
important variable in both US and Canada. Coming very close 
in importance are the variables ‘collateral value to the 
loan amount’ and the ‘judgement on the client's ability to 
turnaround and repay’. The bank’s judgement of management’s 
turnaround ability was frequently stressed as very important 
during the interviews (also discussed in Chapter V) and 
finds support here. The ‘borrowers positive attitude towards 
the debt’ and ‘which method will net the bank the greatest 
return on funds extended’ are considered to be between 
‘important’ and ‘somewhat important 
Significant differences between the US and Canadian 
samples exist in three variables. The US officers feel that 
the collateral value to loan amount and the need to protect 
the bank’s funds at risk are more important than the 
Canadian officers do, and they are also more concerned about 
lender liability issues. The greater concern for lender 
liability among the US officers could explain their 
reluctance for the managerial interventions as part of the 
workout which assume greater importance among the Canadian 
responses. The importance of collateral value to loan 
amount' influencing the response and the financial 
orientation of the primary response strategy falls into a 
pattern of greater importance for financial considerations 
among the US officers as compared to the Canadian officers. 
This focus gets magnified when considered along with the 
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fact that, among the sample firms, a higher percentage of 
the US loans are fully secured (73.5V as against the loans 
made by the Canadian banks (49.3%). 
Public image1 and the 'effect of the bank's action on 
the community* are considered to be of little importance. It 
is surprising that the 'cost of collection of the loan* and 
the 'cost and effort in rehabilitation of the borrower* are 
also considered to be of little importance. This supports 
the impression gained fror the interviews that these banks 
did not view the handling of a problem loan on purely 
econonic or cost/benefit terns. Neither is the ’value of the 
client to the bank as a customer* considered as very 
important. 
The picture that emerges is that while the loan is 
considered as a business proposition and effort is made to 
protect the bank's funds, the bank's response strategy is an 
amalgam of economic and nor-economic variables, and 
objective and subiective influences. It is certainly not a 
pure economic decision which determines the choice between 
liquidation and turnaround. 
5. Discussion 
The qualitative and quantitative data analyzed in this 
section help in developing an understanding of the complex 
nature of the response strategy of the loan otticers. 
Even though the nature of responses and elements 
influencing the responses are discusser as separate irom 
. the two take place simultaneously and are recognition 
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clearly connected. The rating system of the bank is a 
structural approach to recognition of and response to a 
problem loan. The bank's primary interest is in workout as 
against liquidation and this approach dominates its response 
strategies. 
The banks rely on the loan officer to initiate 
recognition and response which is subject to supervision. 
However, during the interim period between problem 
recognition and transfer of the workout of the loan to 
another function within the bank, the loan officer has the 
field open for his efforts at turnaround. 
The picture that emerges is one of two levels of 
response: an initial loan officer's response and a 
subsequent institutional response of the bank. Initially, 
once the problem recognition is initiated, the loan officer 
has the time (till the risk rating system determines a 
different set of responses), the inclination (since he wants 
to preserve a relationship and visualizes his role as an 
active one in helping the client), and the circumstances 
(early stages of the problem) to initiate a workout. As the 
problem worsens, the loan gets transferred to other decision 
making levels where further response strategies are pursued. 
The picture is largely the same for both the US and the 
Canadian banks with a few variations. The Canadian loan 
officers have a managerial approach as their preferred 
response and have less of a concern for lender liability 
issues. The US officers have a preference for a financial 
109 
response, which includes seeking additional coverage and 
guarantees. While the US officers are cilso inclined to 
giving extension of time for repayment and granting 
additional loans as part of their financial approach, they 
are more inclined to resort to the legal process for 
recovery. 
In the next section, the causes for the problem as 
perceived by the loan officers will be discussed and related 
to their response strategies. 
B. An Explanatory Model of Response Strategies 
In order to understand the determinants of the banks' 
response strategies, apart from the elements influencing the 
responses examined earlier, it is important to understand 
the causes for the problem. The literature review in Chapter 
II examined the work of scholars who linked the turnaround 
strategies followed directly to the causes of failure. Thus, 
it is important to understand the causes of decline in these 
firms to help explain the response strategy followed. This 
section goes into the causes for the decline as perceived by 
the loan officers and then a regression model is presented 
to explain the response strategies. 
1. Causes for Decline 
The loan officers were asked to identify the causes, in 
their opinion, for the decline in financial performance of 
the client. A list of 19 variables were provided describing 
internal and external factors contributing to decline. The 
officers responded on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very 
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important) to 5 (unimportant). The mean and standard 
deviation of the variables for the US and Canada are given 
in Table 6.10. 
The most important cause for the decline in both the 
samples is 'incompetent management1. This bears out the 
frequent comments of the bank officials interviewed and is 
consistent with their preoccupation with judging management 
ability as part of their response strategies. The literature 
on decline as also the Dun & Bradstreet statistics place a 
large share of the responsibility for decline on bad 
management. 
The other causes considered important are: 'heavy 
debt1, 'decreased profit margins of the products1, 
'inadequate sales1, 'high overheads1, 'high operating 
expenses1, 'receivables difficulties1, 'weak top team1, and 
'one-man rule'. Those considered to be relatively 
unimportant include: 'poor location’, 'fraud1, and 
'disasters’. 'Neglect' due to reasons such as family/marital 
problems, health, etc. is also low among the list. Coming 
from the perspective of the bank official, it is perhaps not 
surprising that 'high interest rates' is also rated low 
among the causes. The US and Canadian samples differed 
significantly (p < .05) in two variables, 'receivables 
difficulties' and 'disasters’. 
A factor analysis of these causes was performed but the 
emerging factors did not reveal conceptually clear 
groupings. Instead, classifying the variables which are 
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considered relatively more important into two groups 
presents an interesting picture. Grouping four variables as 
external causes (increased competition in the industry, high 
interest rates, declining market size, and receivables 
difficulties) and ten variables as internal causes (rapid 
growth/over expansion, heavy debt, decreased profit margins 
of the products, inadequate sales, high overheads, heavy 
operating expenses, incompetent management, unbalanced 
experience of the top team, one-man rule, and competitively • 
weak), the internal causes appear to be more important. The 
mean for the internal causes for the US and Canada are 2.5 
and 2.6 respectively while the mean for the external causes 
are 3.3 and 3.5 respectively (significant at p <.05). This 
is consistent with the results of another question wherein 
the officers were asked to allot 100 percent to three 
categories of reasons as contributing to the problem loan: 
firm, bank, and the environment. In the US sample, the means 
for the three sources are 67.5 percent for firm, 11 percent 
for the bank, and 21.5 percent for the environment. The 
pattern is similar for Canada where the corresponding 
figures are 69.9 percent, 8.8 percent, and 21.3 percent 
respectively. Thus, in both the samples, internal (firm 
related) causes are considered to be largely responsible for 
the problem as compared to external (bank and environmental 
reasons taken together). 
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2. Causes and Responses Strategies 
The literature on turnaround strategies reviewed in 
Chapter II discusses the position of scholars who linked 
turnaround strategies with the causes for decline. The 
primary interest in workout on the part of the banks would 
also mean that their response strategy would have a 
relationship with their view of the causes for decline. To 
study the relationship between causes of the problem as 
perceived by the loan officers and their contemplated 
responses, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated 
for the US and Canada. The correlations between the response 
factors (weighted using the factor loadings) and their 
component variables, with the causes are listed in Tables 
6.11 and 6.12 for the US and Canada respectively. Tables 
6.11a and 6.12a show the same information with only the 
significant correlations (at .05 and .01 levels) 
highlighted. 
'High overheads’ and 'high operating expenses’ being 
strong internal causes, are closely associated with the 
financial workout in the US and managerial workout in the 
Canadian sample. In the US, 'high interest rates' and 
'competitively weak’ as causes are associated with long-term 
workout, workout-structural, and recommending strategic 
change but not with management change or operating 
improvements. Thus, if external causes of decline are 
predominant, the officers don’t consider changing management 
or improving operations as appropriate responses. In Canada, 
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'high interest rates’ and 'competitively weak’ are 
associated with structural changes like 'mergers’ and 
'downsizing the business', or 'recall of the loan’. 
In the US, incompetent management is strongly 
associated with recommending strategic changes and exit 
strategy such as recall of the loan. A weak top-team is 
associated with management change. In Canada, incompetent 
management and weak top-team are associated with management 
change and recall of loan. As noted earlier, consultants are 
resorted to more often than in the US. 
The picture that emerges from the above correlations is 
that external causes of decline are responded to with more 
long-term and structural strategies. Operating and strategic 
reasons for decline are responded to with recommendation on 
operations/systems improvements. The association of 
management changes and exit strategies with the same set of 
causes can mean that if management change is not possible in 
those situations, the alternative is to exit through legal 
means if necessary. 
3. A Regression Model 
As an outcome of the discussion of the earlier 
sections, a regression model is presented in order to 
capture the joint effect of the causes and the other 
influences on the responses: 
Response = f(Internal causes, external causes. 
Strategy security, severity, turnaround ability, 
cooperation) 
114 
a. The Variables, The 
variables in the model are 
independent and dependent 
made operational as below: 
i) The internal cause for decline is represented by the 
variable 'incompetent management.' 
ii) The external cause for decline is represented by 
the variable 'increased competition in the industry'. 
The above two are considered relatively important among 
the causes and are strongly correlated with the other 
internal and external reasons for decline, as the case 
may be. 
iii) The extent of security or collateral available is 
represented by the response to 'collateral value to 
loan amount’ as an influential variable. 
iv) The severity of decline is represented by the 
response to the question, "which of the following 
statements would best describe the firm when it was 
classified as a problem loan". The responses 
distinguished between temporary problems, serious 
causing a decline but not critical, and crisis which 
threatened the survival of the firm. 
v) The turnaround ability is represented by the 
variable: 'judgement on the client's ability to 
turnaround and repay'. 
vi) The cooperation with the bank is represented by the 
variable 'borrower's positive attitude towards the 
debt'. 
vii) The dependent variable 'response strategy' is 
represented by the response factors described earlier. 
b. Results. The results of the regression analysis are 
listed in Table 6.13 giving the standardized coefficients 
along with the R squared and the F values for the US and 
Canadian samples. Table 6.13a provides a summary view with 
the significant coefficients highlighted. Except for 
severity, all the variables are on an interval scale ranging 
from 1 for 'very important' to 5 for 'unimportant' (or will 
not be considered'). The severity is on a 3-point scale with 
1 representing minor problems and 3 representing a crisis. 
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Going by the R squared, the model proved a better fit 
with the US data (mean R squared =.38) as compared to the 
Canadian data (mean R squared =.14) though individual 
variables are significant in more instances in the Canadian 
regressions that in the US. While individual elements are 
important, they operate in different combinations in the two 
samples. 
In the US sample the primary financial workout strategy 
is influenced by cooperation. The exit strategy is 
influenced by more variables, though cooperation and 
internal causes alone are significant. Management change as 
a strategy is very strongly influenced by cooperation of the 
client. 
In the Canadian sample, the primary managerial workout 
strategy is influenced by the causes of decline, importance 
of collateral value and the extent of cooperation. A legal 
recovery strategy is also influenced by the extent of 
severity of the problems. Surprisingly, the influence of 
turnaround ability does not appear to be strong on any of 
the strategies. 
The limitations which must be kept in mind while 
interpreting this model is that the response factors 
(dependent variables), as described earlier, are not very 
precise and are only broad indicators of response 
objectives. The independent variables were selected on the 
basis of their importance, as an outcome of the preceeding 
quantitative and qualitative analysis, in influencing the 
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response strategies. The data representing the variables 
were not defined, at the time of collection, to serve as 
inputs in this model. For example, the variable 'judgment on 
management's turnaround ability' only measures the influence 
of that variable in formulating response and not the 
banker's judgment of management’s turnaround ability. This 
is also true of the variables representing cooperation, and 
collateral value. Therefore, the coefficients of the 
independent variables do not reflect the direction of 
causation. Standardized coefficients are reported to 
facilitate the comparison of the relative importance of the 
variables. 
4. Discussion 
This section considered the relationship of the bank’s 
response strategies with the causes of decline and other 
influences on the bank. Looking at the same issues from the 
perspective of the client raises concerns for strategic 
management. 
The interventions which a bank plans in response to a 
situation of decline in a client is an external influence on 
the client's strategy. The literature on decline and 
turnaround strategies reviewed earlier looked at the 
turnaround strategies of a firm in relation to the causes of 
decline and connected the two. The assumption is that the 
turnaround strategy is directly determined by, and related 
to, the causes for the decline. The literature does not take 
into account the external influences on the strategy. The 
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array of options available to a bank in order to intervene 
in a problem loan reveals the extent of the bank's influence 
on the firm's strategy. Scholars have suggested that 
operational causes for decline should be tackled with 
operating strategies, and strategic reasons for decline with 
strategic turnarounds. It is necessary that our 
understanding of turnaround strategies be re-calibrated to 
take into account these external influences, the sources of 
these influences, and the objectives behind them. 
In the data studied, the bank's proposed workout 
strategy for the problem loan translates into a turnaround 
strategy for the firm. However, it is important to recognize 
that the strategy is initiated with the primary purpose of 
protecting the banks funds. The bank's measures of 
intervention in the firm to achieve a turnaround (in order 
to protect the bank's interests) need not correspond with 
the long-run interests of the firm. The data available in 
this study does not permit a discussion on whether or not 
there is a congruence. But it is reasonable to speculate 
that there is a greater possibility of congruence in the 
early stages of decline when the bank's funds are more 
likely to be fully protected. This leads to the possibility 
of differing response strategies due to the changing nature 
of objectives, in a dynamic context. 
In the process of recognition and response, the bank 
appears to follow a system akin to the strategic analysis of 
the firm. Management ability is judged, the firm's 
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performance in relation to the industry considered, external 
and internal reasons for the decline scrutinized, and the 
clients ability to generate a positive income flow in the 
future assessed. Once the firm has entered the problem loan 
category, the bank is constantly evaluating the firm's 
capacity for survival at various stages in its decline. The 
decision to be made is broadly workout or liquidation as a 
strategy. From a strategic management perspective, this 
analysis of the strengths and weakness in relation to the 
opportunities and threats in the environment is recommended 
as an on-going activity for the firm. During a time of 
decline, the analysis is being performed by an external 
agency also leading to a decision that affects the survival 
of the firm. 
The bank's response, as argued in this chapter, is 
dependent on its perception of the causes for decline, apart 
from considerations of the cooperation of the client, extent 
of security, judgement on the client's ability to 
turnaround, severity of the problem, etc. These are 
variables which a firm can influence through its conscious 
action. Thus an outcome of this analysis for a decision 
maker in the firm is to provide him a better understanding 
of the forces acting on an influential player like the bank. 
C. Size and Other Issues 
In this section, the question of firm size and its 
influence on the nature of management research concerns, the 
questions relating to lender liability, and the variance 
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between bank's in their approach to problem recognition, are 
considered. 
1. Size of the Firm 
The impact of the size of the firm on issues concerning 
decline and turnaround is not often explicitly made in the 
literature. The population ecology perspective would suggest 
that as an organization increases in size, it becomes more 
bureaucratic and inefficient and less flexible to adapt to 
changing circumstances. Adams and Brock (1987) have argued 
that once firms become big, they are considered to be too 
important to be allowed to fail. Scott (1976) agrees that 
survival of large organizations is seldom threatened by 
internal shocks. 
Empirical research in the field of decline and 
turnarounds suffers from a size bias. Due to the dependence 
on data bases such as PIMS, COMPUSTAT, etc. or published 
case studies, it is the large firms which get frequently 
analyzed. At the other end of the spectrum, studies in the 
field of entrepreneurship look into survival rates and 
causes of start-up failures of fledgling firms., Schwartz & 
Menon (1985) comparing failing firms with non-failing firms 
do not find size (defined by operating sales revenue) to 
make a difference in the frequency of executive succession. 
In a study undertaken for the Commission on Bankruptcy 
Laws (1973), Fredland reported that except for very large 
firms, there is very little statistical relationship between 
size, as measured by sales, employees and fixed assets, and 
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the likelihood of failure. The National Small Business 
Administration reported that small businesses (defined as 
those with liabilities of $100,000 or less) accounted for 
50.5 percent of the 1981 failures. The Dun & Bradstreet 
figures showing that 95 percent of the failures involve 
liabilities of less than $1 million (Committee on Small 
Business, 1982) also stress the high failure rate among 
small businesses.. 
Thus, it appears that while the extent of failures is 
quite substantial among small businesses, most studies have 
looked at large ones, and research specifically including 
size as a variable has been sketchy. In the present study, 
the respondents were asked where possible to choose firms 
which had been in existence for five years or more. While 
there was no pre-condition on size, they were asked to 
categorize the firms as small, medium and large, from the 
bank's perspective. Table 6.14 shows that almost all the 
firms reported on are between small and medium. During 
interviews, the loan officers and senior bank officials 
discussed issues relating to large firms too. This makes it 
possible to develop an appreciation of the variance in 
recognition and response issues due to the size of the 
client. 
In lending to large firms, it is usually probable that 
more than one bank is involved in a syndicate. While the 
largest lender takes the role of the lead bank and the 
others follow, during times of crisis in the firm, bankers 
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remarked that it is a big problem for the banks to agree on 
a common response strategy amongst themselves. The many 
judgmental issues involved lead to disagreement in approach 
and banks often worry if one lender is able to extract a 
better priority in loan repayment or security as against the 
others. A frequently used strategy in such situations is for 
one or more dominant lender(s) to buy-out the smaller 
lenders. 
The question of size is closely related to the issue- of 
ownership and control. Table 4.2 shows that about 94 percent 
of the client firms in both samples are owner-managed. Where 
this is so, the bankers feel that a supreme CEO (also 
usually the entrepreneur) may often be blind to 
organizational faults and the firm may suffer from an 
imbalance in managerial skills. But once convinced, it is 
easy to get him or her to act. In professionally managed 
firms, the bankers perception is that the chance of self¬ 
recognition of problems and corrective action is greater. 
One senior lending officer reported that among 60 percent of 
his large-corporate clientele, there is still little 
separation between ownership and management. Though there 
may be a board of directors and public holding of equity, 
management is still dominated by the owners. However, much 
of scholarly research on decline and turnaround strategies 
has ignored the question of size or nature of management. 
There is an underlying assumption of large size and 
122 
professional management, often dictated by the nature of the 
sample. 
One important area where the question of size and 
ownership/control issue has a bearing is that of change of 
management. Management change has frequently been considered 
in the literature as a necessity and sometimes as a 
precondition for successful turnaround strategies in a firm 
(Chapter II). When there is no separation between ownership 
and control, change in management would be tantamount to 
sale of the firm. Moreover, banks are wary of exercising or 
appearing to exercise control over the firm on account of 
lender liability considerations (discussed subsequently). 
One banker even commented that "if we were suggesting a 
change in management, the client is more likely to change 
banks." Thus, when management change is not a feasible 
option, other types of intervention become necessary. 
A common approach to the question of management 
capabilities requiring changes is through appointing a 
consultant. Not only does it serve to impress on the client 
that the bank is concerned enough to want an independent 
opinion, it serves as a buffer against charges of lender 
liability. Banks maintain a list of consultants who 
specialize in workout situations and allow the firm to 
choose any one for the purpose. One senior vice president in 
charge of workout read out to the researcher sections of a 
consulting firm's report on a large troubled client where 
the consultant was evaluating the capabilities of individual 
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members of the top management team. The ranker remarked that 
they would push for a management change in that particular 
case as part of their workout package. Loan officers 
reported that at their level, they would sometimes resort to 
a direct confrontation with the client (possibly using a 
confidant of the client like an attorney or accountant) to 
discuss managerial weakness. Most often, the approach is to 
make oblique suggestions and recommendations to the client 
on the need to strengthen top management, point out weak 
areas of expertise, and use shocks such as asking the client 
to find another bank if there is a lack of agreement between 
the client and the bank. "It takes a shock like refusing a 
line of credit or calling them in to discuss concerns of the 
account to serve as a catalyst for change of management 
structure," explained one loan officer. 
The response option of exchanging debt for equity in 
the firm as part of a workout strategy is another one that 
favors large firms, particularly when there is public 
trading of stock. This is, however, not a universally 
popular move and varies between banks. A few of the bankers 
stated that they use it as a specific policy tool in some 
cases with the objective of providing relief to the client 
in the short run but benefiting from the sacrifice and risk 
taken through more than proportional returns in the long 
run. But there were others who stated that it was definitely 
against their bank policy to exchange debt for equity. 
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While banks frequently denied anv difference in the way 
they treat large and small problem loans, odd comments such 
as "the time and effort must be justified.." indicate that 
differences in treatment due to size cannot be ruled out. 
The responses show that banks do not apparently make 
cost/benefit calculations. Discussions with the bankers 
indicate that if the problem does not get resolved at the 
level of the loan officer, an institutional response is 
influenced by questions of size and extent of financial 
involvement. 
To sum up, the effect of the size of the firm on 
decline and turnaround issues is considerable. However, 
neither has past empirical research specifically included 
size as a variable, nor qualified its conclusions. 
2. Lender Liability 
The question of lender liability has been mentioned in 
earlier sections as affecting responses at the level of the 
loan officer and in the nature of the bank's policy towards 
problem loans. In the broad sense in which it is used, the 
term 'lender liability' deals with the liability on the part 
of lenders in the downfall of the business; at some point 
bankers can exert so much influence on a company that they 
become liable for its failure. The issue gained in 
importance some time ago when in 1976, in the case of the 
Farah Manufacturing Company, the firm was in trouble and the 
bankers replaced the CEO, William Farah. The troubles got 
worse and Farah managed to regain control in 1978 and 
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revived the firm, and sued the banks claiming their 
involvement damaged it. A Texas court in 1982 awarded the 
firm $18.9 million in damages. More cases have come to 
light but there is a feeling among the bankers that while 
cases often go against them in the trial courts, their 
chances are better in the appeals court. 
Some bankers feel the Farah case and subsequent ones 
have altered the way business is done. "What was considered 
normal banking practice, even giving of advice is held back 
to avoid giving impression of control," said one vice- 
president in charge of workout. Clauses about 'no changes in 
management’ or 'replace with comparable management’ included 
in covenants are toned down. The lawyers are involved early 
in a workout process to protect the bank's interests from a 
legal angle, suggestions are carefully worded, and 
consultants are used. 
In the discussion earlier about elements influencing 
the response of the bank, the significant difference between 
the US and Canada in the importance of lender liability 
concerns was pointed out. The absence of jury trials or 
punitive damages, in addition to laws favoring creditors 
more generally have made it less of a concern in Canada. 
However, bankers have seen a few lender liability cases in 
Canadian courts too and feel that it is the influence of 
decisions in the US courts that is affecting the judiciary's 
approach. 
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A few of the bankers who do not express grave concerns 
about the lender liability issue feel that it is just reward 
for inappropriate behavior on the part of the bank. A few of 
the US bankers also quoted instances where errant borrowers 
use the lender liability issue as a negotiating tool with 
the bank in return for release from personal guarantees. 
To sum up, there are genuine concerns about not wanting 
to exercise control especially among the US banks, and it 
appears to have altered the way they influence the firm in a 
problem loan situation. While the approach was more direct 
erstwhile, it is more indirect now. Banks are wary of giving 
direct advice and it is a major development in a bank-client 
relationship. It is possible that in marginal cases where 
previously a workout strategy might have been preferred, 
there would be a greater inclination for an exit strategy 
now. By and large, bankers are in the process of accepting 
it as part of the current lending environment necessitating 
suitable changes in their policies and procedures. 
3. Variance Between Banks 
The number of respondents from individual banks is not 
sufficient to able to test for differences between them in 
their responses. However, on the basis of the discussions, 
it is possible to identify areas where differences in basic 
approach or philosophy of the bank to problem loans 
differentiates between their recognition and response 
patterns. 
While all banks are uniformly interested in early 
recognition and would prefer a workout of the problem, 
distinctions can be made in the implementation of their 
policies. Among the Canadian banks, one relied on an 
automated system of controls for the corporate office to 
monitor all problem loans. This bank incorporated within its 
rating system an option of withdrawing from the loan by sale 
to another bank at an early stage of decline as a specific 
. response strategy. (However, a loan officer interviewed 
admitted the problems in implementing that approach due to 
the difficulty of the borrower finding a willing bank.) This 
reveals a conservative attitude of the bank in preferring to 
withdraw from the loan if possible at an early stage. This 
same bank does not have a centralized workout department but 
leaves it to the loan officer to administer the workout. 
There is close supervision from district and corporate 
offices, and decision making on the response strategies 
shifts to higher levels beyond a risk category, while still 
administered through the loan officer. One of the US banks, 
which had recently seen a change of the CEO subsequent to a 
merger with another bank described how the new CEO's 
preference was to be more accommodating in an effort to 
workout rather than to confront the client for a quick 
settlement. While two of the Canadian banks reported their 
willingness to consider accepting stock in the firm as part 
of a restructuring strategy, a third definitely ruled it out 
as against company policy. 
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A bank's attitude towards its problem loan client is 
also revealed in the officers' description of the client's 
status after a successful workout. Some banks were very sure 
that most of their clients preferred to leave because of a 
(real or imagined) stigma of having gone through a workout 
due to loss of credibility, etc. Some others were equally 
definite that most of their successful workouts preferred to 
stay though in some cases handled by a different loan 
officer. It is possible that these differing conclusions are 
a result of the differences in the way the clients are dealt 
with. 
There are differences in the way banks structure their 
handling of the loans. This has been covered earlier. In the 
US, as the banks grow in size they tend to separate workout 
as a function from loan review. One bank felt they had a 
larger workout department than comparable banks because of 
their philosophy of trying to help the clients workout 
rather than to find an early exit. (This bank also believed 
that it was able to retain a large number of its clients 
after workout.) 
The implications of these variations can be important 
for a manager. A particular bank's philosophy, attitude to 
problem loans, and handling of them needs to be understood 
by the client in order to obtain suitable assistance as part 
of a turnaround strategy. 
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The next chapter will provide a summary and a 
discussion of the overall implications of this study for 
research and for managers. 
Table 6.1 
Responsibility for Handling the Problem Loa 
ITEM US 
% 
Canada 
% 
1. Loan Officer exclusively 
handling the problem loan 50 71 
2. Handling with assistance 
from loan review/workout de¬ 
partment 41.2 16.6 
3. Loan transferred to work¬ 
out department though loan 
officer still involved 2.9 4.1 
4. Loan transferred to work¬ 
out department and loan offi¬ 
cer not involved 5.9 8.3 
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Table 6.2 
Role of the Loan Officer 
Item Very 
Important 
% 
Somewhat 
Important 
% 
Unimportant 
% 
Provide an early warning to a 
firm of an impending crisis 
US 90.5 9.5 0 
CANADA 82.1 17.9 0 
Help a client to the extent pos¬ 
sible in overcoming problems 
US 82.6 17.4 0 
CANADA 78.8 19.0 1.2 
Table 6.3 
Lags in Classification 
(Mean number of weeks; standard deviation in parantheses) 
Item US Canada 
Time lag between identifica- 
tion of a problem and its clas- 11.96 11.30 
sification as a ’’problem loan” (13.4) (11.9) 
Time lag between identifica- 
tion of a problem and the 
client being informed of the 4.07 2.98 
bank’s concern (5.24) (6.1) 
Note: Where response was given < 7 days or 
as ’’immediate” etc was coded as 1 week 
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Table 6.4 
Means of Response Variables 
ITEM US Canada t 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
1.Seeking additional collateral for existing 
loans 2.38 1.56 2.83 1.59 
2. Seeking guarantees in addition to existing 
collateral 2.84 1.53 2.82 1.58 
3. Granting additional loans with collat¬ 
eral/guarantees 3.90 1.27 3.83 1.45 
4.Time extension of the due date of the debt 2.47 1.33 3.32 1.48 ** 
5. Partial forgiveness of the debt 4.37 1.1 4.56 0.99 
6. Sale of loan to another bank 4.60 0.81 4.04 1.30 * 
7. Terminate the loan allowing client time to 
find another bank 3.16 1.42 3.03 1.40 
8. Recommend additional capitalization 2.47 1.30 2.31 1.44 
9. Recommend downsizing business/asset di¬ 
vestment 2.89 1.61 3.03 1.59 
10. Recommend merger/acquisition by an¬ 
other 2.63 1.47 3.15 1.65 
11. Recommend change of top management 
(CEO) 3.23 1.67 3.60 1.52 
12. Recommend change of key personnel 3.58 1.34 3.41 1.50 
13. Recommend change of strategies 2.87 1.50 2.92 1.38 
14. Recommend use of consultants 3.00 1.57 3.06 1.59 
15. Suggest impeovement in systems & con¬ 
trols 3.10 1.47 2.86 1.54 
16. Suggest improvements in operations/cost 
reductions 2.45 1.55 2.67 1.42 
17. Recall of loan 2.33 1.32 2.67 1.45 
18. Proceed to recover through state courts 2.97 1.43 3.80 1.37 ** 
19. Proceed to recover through bankruptcy 
courts 3.33 1.49 3.94 1.34 * 
20. Settle out of court with loss of interest 4.10 1.06 4.26 1.11 
21. Settle out of court with loss of interest & 
principal 3.97 1.30 4.26 1.16 
22. Exchange of debt for an equity position 4.30 1.18 4.67 0.87 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 6.7 
Response Factors - US 
ITEM Factor 
Loadings 
Eigen 
Values 
% of 
Variance 
Alpha 1 
1. Workout-flnl 5.35 24.3 
.86 
Addtl collateral .62 
Guarantees .77 
Addtl loans .84 
Addtl capital .61 
Rec strg change .71 
Opers impr .73 
.81 
2.Exit-legal 3.88 
17.6 
Sale of loan .58 
State courts .76 
Btcy court .76 
Setl int loss .91 
.76 
3.Workout - It(I) 2.15 
9.8 
Time extn .59 
Rec conslt .89 
Syst impr .89 
2.07 
Q A 
4.Workout-lt(II) 9.4 
.o4 
Part forgiveness .87 
Ex debt equity .86 
.72 
5.Mgt change 1.68 
7.6 
Rec top change .77 
Rec mgr change .76 
.67 
6.Withdraw-loss 1.20 5.4 
Term with time .85 
Loan recall .67 
Setl int/pci loss .48 
4.8 .66 7. Workout-structural 1.06 
Rec downsize .64 
Rec merger 
1 Total 
.83 
79.0 .83 
Table 6.8 
Response Factors - Canada 
ITEM Factor 
Loadings 
Eigen 
Values 
% of 
Variance 
Alpha 
1. Workout-mgrl 4.84 22 .84 
Rec top change .72 
Rec mgr change .74 
Rec strg change .76 
Rec conslt .68 
Syst improv .74 
Opers improv .72 
2. Recover-Legal 3.29 14.9 .78 
Loan recall .82 
State courts .78 
Btcy courts .77 
3. Exit with loss 1.88 8.5 79 
Part forgiveness .71 
Setl int loss .79 
Setl int /pci loss .81 
Ex debt equity .69 
4. Reduce exposure 1.54 7.0 .69 
Addtl collateral .66 
Guarantees .74 
Addtl capital .54 
Rec downsize .43 
5. Withdraw 1.50 6.8 .54 
Sale of loan .77 
Term with time .73 
6. Wo-fin involvement 1.17 5.3 .47 
Addtl loans .47 
Time extn .71 
7. Rec merger 
(One variable only) .62 1.03 4.7 
Total 69.3 .81 
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Table 6.9 
Elements Influencing the Responses 
ITEM US Canada 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. t 
1. Public image 
2. Borrower’s positive attitude to- 
3.8 1.3 3.9 1.1 
wards the debt 
3. Borrower’s negative attitude to- 
2.4 1.4 2.6 1.3 
wards the debt 
4. Judgement on the client’s ability to 
3.3 1.7 3.7 • 1.5 
turnaround and repay 1.7 1 1.9 1 
5. Collateral value to loan amount 
6. Value of the client to the bank as a 
1.4 0.6 2 1.1 ** 
customer 3.5 1-1. 3.5 1.1 
7. Cost of collection of the loan 
8. Cost and effort in rehabilitation of 
3.7 1.3 3.5 1.2 
the borrower 
9. Which method will net the bank 
3.7 1.2 3.5 1.2 
the greatest return on funds extended 
10. Effect of the bank’s action on the 
2.7 1.5 2.4 1.4 
community 
11. Firm’s performance in relation to 
3.8 1.4 3.9 1.1 
the industry 3.5 1.4 3.2 1.3 
12. Lender liability issues 
13. Protection of the bank’s funds at 
2.9 1.6 3.9 1.2 ** 
risk 1.3 0.5 1.8 1.1 * 
14. Attitude of the other creditors 3.6 1.2 3.5 1.3 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
Table 6.10 
Causes for the Decline 
ITEM US Canada 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. t 
1. Rapid growth/Over expan- 
sion 3.0 1.4 3.2 1.6 
2. Inadequate capacity 3.3 1.3 3.5 1.5 
3. Poor location 4.2 1.3 4.1 1.2 
4. Heavy debt 2.2 1.3 2.7 1.4 
5. Decreased profit margins of 
the products 2.6 1.3 2.5 1.4 
6. Increased competition in 
the industry 3.0 1.3 2.8 1.4 
7. High interest rates 
8. Declining market size of the 
3.7 0.9 3.9 1.1 
industry 3.5 1.4 3.5 1.4 
9. Inadequate sales 2.7 1.4 2.4 1.5 
10. High overheads 2.3 1.3 2.4 1.4 
11. Heavy operating expenses 2.2 1.4 2.6 1.4 
12. Receivables difficulties 2.8 1.7 3.7 1.5 * 
13. Incompetent management 
14. Unbalanced experience in 
1.8 1.1 2.0 1.1 
the top team 2.3 1.6 2.3 1.3 
15. One-man rule 2.7 1.7 2.7 1.5 
16. Competitively weak 
17. Neglect(family problems, 
3.4 1.4 3.3 1.3 
etc.) 3.5 1.5 4.0 1.4 
18. Fraud 4.2 1.2 4.4 1.3 
19. Disaster(fire etc.) 4.4 1.2 4.8 0.7 * 
* p< .05 
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Table 0.11 
Correlation of Causes and Responses - US 
Item Rapid 
Gro¬ 
wth 
Low 
Capa¬ 
city 
High 
Debt 
Low 
Mar¬ 
gins 
Inds 
Com- 
ptn 
High 
Inte¬ 
rest 
Dec 
mkt 
size 
Low 
sales 
1. Workout-finl 19 -01 11 33 -11 19 18 26 
Addtl collateral 47** -02 22 32 -17 -03 00 02 
Guarantees 18 . 00 00 37* 02 21 15 36 
Addtl loans 04 01 12 25 -30 -17 07 20 
Addtl capital 24 13 -07 29 00 27 26 22 
Rec strg change 10 10 09 24 10 33 12 16 
Opers improv -08 07 16 17 09 05 35 30 
2. Exit-Legal -06 44* 47* 32 46* 39* 12 08 
Sale of loan -01 00 13 20 09 29 28 06 
State courts -02 34 22 21 23 21 -08 -01 
Btcy courts -20 35 44* 25 45 36 25 12 
Setl int loss -02 45* 46* 22 45* 33 -03 06 
3. Workout-lt(I) 26 -08 22 31 00 35 42* 06 
Time Extn -01 -13 09 04 08 35 43 06 
Rec conslt 26 -18 18 19 06 33 33 01 
Syst impr 30 11 25 46* -12 19 30 09 
4. Workout-lt(II) 01 13 27 -04 05 48** 28 -01 
Part forgiveness 03 04 20 06 -15 38 27 -01 
Ex debt equity 00 19 29 -12 23 49** 23 -01 
5. Mgt change -07 -04 02 19 -09 05 33 36 
Rec top change -10 00 07 13 -07 10 34 32 
Rec mgr change 00 -06 -05 19 -09 -03 21 29 
0. Withdraw-loss 19 -11 07 29 10 45* 04 -16 
Term with time 09 -17 07 29 04 20 06 07 
Loan recall 08 -14 -28 -01 05 14 -19 -29 
Setl int/pcl loss 02 10 25 09 20 65** 18 -13 
7. Workout-struct 07 -09 32 27 12 60** 61** 24 
Rec downsize 04 -09 12 31 07 36 61** 35 
Rec merger 07 -06 42* 17 13 66** 47* 09 
* p < .05 ** P < *oi Continued, next page. 
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Table G.ll(cont.) 
Item High 
over 
heads 
1. Workout-finl 62** 
Addtl collateral 45* 
Guanrantees 43* 
Addtl loans 43* . 
Addtl capital 42* ' 
Rec strg change 51** 
Opers improv 15 
2. Exit-Legal -04 
Sale of loan 19 
State courts -05 
Btcy courts -02 
Setl int loss -16 
3. Workout-lt(I) 25 
Time Extn 38* 
Rec conslt 12 
Syst impr 19 
4. Workout-lt(II) 11 
Part forgiveness 22 
Ex debt equity -01 
5. Mgt change 61** 
Rec top change 52** 
Rec mgr change 51** 
Q. Withdraw-loss 04 
Term with time 04 
Loan recall -16 
Setl int/pcl loss 16 
7. Workout-struct 35 
Rec downsize 37* 
Rec merger 24 
High 
oper 
exp 
Rec. 
diffic 
Inc¬ 
omp 
mgmt 
Weak 
top 
team 
One- 
man 
rule 
Comp¬ 
ly 
weak 
Neg¬ 
lect 
59** -02 -32 36 -09 21 -06 
36 09 00 27 01 01 06 
42* -02 -20 17 -14 21 -10 
19 -05 -10 28 -11 03 02 
54** -09 -23 33 -14 16 -18 
60** 01 -41 26 -14 24 -09 
57** 65** 15 -42* 32 03 32 
20 26 09 -20 30 26 -03 
36 17 -01 14 -02 10 11 
11 06 18 -21 36 23 12 
12 31 14 20 36 30 -15 
11 24 -05 20 14 09 -05 
34 07 -21 03 -13 15 -16 
42* 22 -35 00 -15 15 -11 
25 -03 -23 -05 -10 01 -25 
22 16 10 12 -07 24 00 
20 -09 -04 -12 18 47** 06 
19 06 14 01 22 38* 23 
18 -21 -21 -23 19 48** -11 
28 18 -07 50** 01 16 -02 
21 24 07 43* 14 26 -01 
27 06 -21 43* -15 00 -02 
30 -03 31 09 20 40* 05 
14 04 29 14 23 25 -03 
02 -16 39* -02 17 29 19 
36 19 04 12 20 39* -02 
50** 13 00 18 43* 53** -29 
44* 15 07 25 38 62** -27 
44* 08 -06 08 38* 33 23 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 Continued, next page 
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Table 6.11a (cont.) 
(Significance Highlighted) 
Item Rapid Low High Low Inds High Dec Low 
Gro- Capa- Debt Mar- Com- Inte- mkt sales 
wth city gins ptn rest size 
1. Workout-finl • • • • • . 
Addtl collateral ** 
Guanrantees * % • « ( # 
Addtl loans 
Addtl capital 
Rec strg change 
Opers improv 
2. Exit-Legal * * * * 
Sale of loan 
State courts 
Btcy courts * 
Setl int loss * * * 
3. Workout-lt(I) * 
Time Extn 
Rec conslt 
Syst impr * 
4. Workout-lt(II) ** 
Part forgiveness 
Ex debt equity * * 
6. Mgt change 
Rec top change 
Rec mgr change 
6. Withdraw-loss * 
Term with time 
Loan recall 
Setl int/pcl loss ** 
7. Workout-struct ** ** 
Rec downsize ** 
Rec merger * ** * • • • • • 
* p < .05 ** p< .01 Continued, next page 
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Table 6.11a(cont.) 
Item High High Rec. Inc- Weak One- Comp- Neg- 
over- oper diffic omp top man tly lect 
heads exp mgmt team rule weak 
1. Workout-finl + * ** 
Addtl collateral * 
Guanrantees * * 
Addtl loans * 
Addtl capital * ' ** 
Rec strg change ** ** 
Opers improv ** ** * 
2. Exit-Legal 
Sale of loan 
State courts 
Btcy courts 
Setl int loss 
3. Workout-lt(I) 
Time Extn * * 
Rec conslt 
Syst impr 
4. Workout-lt(II) ** 
Part forgiveness * 
Ex debt equity ** 
5. Mgt change ** ** 
Rec top change ** * 
Rec mgr change ** * 
6. Withdraw-loss * 
Term with time • •••«• • • 
Loan recall * 
Setl int/pcl loss * 
7. Workout-struct ** * ** 
Rec downsize * * ** 
Rec merger * * 
* p < .05 **p<.01 
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Table 6.12 
Correlation of Causes and Responses - Canada 
Item Rapid 
Gro¬ 
wth 
Low 
Capa¬ 
city 
High 
Debt 
Low 
Mar¬ 
gins 
Inds 
Com- 
ptn 
High 
Inte¬ 
rest 
Dec 
mkt 
size 
Low 
sales 
1 Workout-mgrl 27** 35** 24** 15 11 25** 05 -07 
Rec top change 18* 26** 24** 07 -07 10 -10 -07 
Rec mgr change 23** 19* 19* 07 05 14 -08 -05 
Rec strg change 12 25** 10 20* 14 19* 10 -04 
Rec conslt 28** 30** 34** 23* 07 28** 06 -15 
Syst improv 33** 33** 16 16 05 12 10 -08 
Opers improv 18* 20* 15 16 13 16 06 06 
2. Recover-Legal 04 25** 11 08 05 -02 -03 -04 
Loan recall -05 25** 13 08 07 • -01 03 00 
State courts 09 24** 08 00 01 -01 -07 -08 
Btcy courts 04 17 10 15 08 . -02 -07 02 
3. Exit with loss 14 02 23** 13 11 16 07 -01 
Part forgiveness 12 05 32** 10 10 25** 11 06 
Setl int loss 14 03 12 11 07 10 01 -04 
Setl int/pcl loss 17 13 20* 15 10 09 06 00 
Ex debt equity -07 -09 04 06 15 09 07 07 
4. Reduce exposure 27** 28** 04 15 17 23* 15 04 
Addtl collateral 21* 24** -02 25** 12 20* 16 06 
Guarantees 15 17 07 03 16 16 06 12 
Addtl capital 23* 18* 08 02 17* 17* 05 03 
Rec downsize 22* 27** 16 18* 02 21* 27** 00 
5. Withdraw 22 29** 12 10 -01 06 02 -15 
Sale of loan 28** 23* 20* 14 -02 08 03 -20* 
Term with time 11 30** 04 00 -01 01 00 -02 
6. Wo-fin involve 23* 11 08 13 02 15 19* 07 
Addtl loans 18* 11 06 -06 -07 11 18* 10 
Time extn 20* 11 10 20* 06 15 13 06 
7. Rec merger 11 20* 24** 34** 10 25** 14 13 
* p< -05, ** p< .01 Continued, next page. 
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Table 6.12(cont.) 
Item High High Rec. Inc- Weak One Comp- Neg- 
over 
heads 
oper 
exp 
diffic omp 
mgmt 
top 
team 
man 
rule 
tly 
weak 
lect 
1. Workout-mgrl 43** 43** 10 30** 40** 21* 17 22* 
Rec top change 32** 29** 16 39** 44** 32** 14 33** 
Rec mgr change 33** 33** 07 30** 40** 23* 15 14 
Rec strg change 19* 15 -04 14 19* 10 12 16 
Rec conslt 27** 32** 19* 28** 32** 18* 10 17* 
Syst improv 47** 41** 09 24** 32** 23* 06 15 
Opers improv 46** 47** -01 03 15 -03 08 06 
2. Recover-Legal 04 08 36** 39** 21* 34** 24** 18* 
Loan recall -04 -01 35** 48** 28** 34** 25** 19* 
State courts -03 02 27** 27** 09 30** 13 15 
Btcy courts 18* 16 36** 25** 15 23* 21* 15 
3. Exit with loss 06 10 24** 11 10 25** 13 08 
Part forgiveness 06 07 15 01 03 15 08 03 
Setl int loss 11 11 27** 18* 16 20* 12 14 
Setl int/pcl loss 10 15 32** 22* 22* 30** 22* 02 
Ex debt equity -03 02 01 -10 -11 07 -04 03 
4. Reduce exposure 32** 21* 18 05 15 14 10 15 
Addtl collateral 21* 15 19 09 13 10 16 10 
Guarantees 26** 13 18 06 08 19 06 18* 
Addtl capital 30** 19* -02 -03 15 -03 05 01 
Rec downsize 22* 18* 15 -01 11 09 -02 05 
5. Withdraw 14 13 06 17 27** 08 03 03 
Sale of loan 19* 19* 01 05 22* -01 00 -05 
Term with time 08 05 10 26** 26** 13 05 10 
0. Wo-fin involve 18* 17* 07 -05 -01 12 02 12 
Addtl loans 17 14 -02 -16 03 -01 -05 -07 
Time extn 17 17 11 06 -02 15 05 19* 
7. Rec merger 32** 38** 28** 15 24** 20* 22* 10 
*1 >< .05 
' ** P < -01 Continued, next page 
Table 6.12a (cont.) 
(Significance Highlighted) 
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Item Rapid 
Gro¬ 
wth 
Low 
Capa¬ 
city 
High 
Debt 
Low 
Mar¬ 
gins 
Inds 
Com- 
ptn 
High 
Inte¬ 
rest 
Dec 
mkt 
size 
Low 
sales 
** ** * * ** 
* ♦ * ** 
** * * 
** * * 
** ** ** * ** 
** ** . 
* ♦ 
** 
** 
** • 
** 
• 
** ** 
* • 
** ** * 
* * * ** * 
* * * * 
* ** * * ** 
** 
** * * * 
** 
♦ * 
* * 
* ★ • 
* ** ** ** 
, Workout-mgrl 
Rec top change 
Rec mgr change 
Rec strg change 
Rec conslt 
Syst improv 
Opers improv 
2. Recover-Legal 
Loan recall 
State courts 
Btcy courts 
3. Exit with loss 
Part forgiveness 
Setl int loss 
Setl int/pcl loss 
Ex debt equity 
4. Reduce exposure 
Addtl collateral 
Guarantees 
Addtl capital 
Rec downsize 
5. Withdraw 
Sale of loan 
Term with time 
0. Wo-fin involve 
Addtl loans 
Time extn 
7. Rec merger 
* p< .05, ** p< .01 Continued, next page. 
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Table 0.12a(cont.) 
Item High 
over 
heads 
High 
oper 
exp 
Rec. 
diffic 
Inc¬ 
omp 
mgmt 
Weak 
top 
team 
One- 
man 
rule 
Comp- 
tly 
weak 
Neg¬ 
lect 
1. Workout-mgrl ** ** • * * 
Rec top change ** • +* ** ** ** 
Rec mgr change ** ** . ** *+ * • 
Rec strg change *, - • . * • • 
Rec conslt ** * ** * * 
Syst improv *+ ** . ** ** * • 
Opers improv ** . . • • • 
2. Recover-Legal ** ** * ** ** ♦ 
Loan recall ** *+ ** ** ** * 
State courts ** ** ** 
Btcy courts * ** ** * * 
3. Exit with loss ** • ** 
Part forgiveness • • • 
Setl int loss ** * * 
Setl int/pcl loss ** * * ** * 
Ex debt equity 
4. Reduce exposure ** * 
Addtl collateral * 
Guarantees ** * 
Addtl capital ** * 
Rec downsize * * 
5. Withdraw • • ** 
Sale of loan * * * 
Term with time • • ** ++ 
6. Wo-fin involve * ♦ • 
Addtl loans • • • 
Time extn • • • ♦ 
7. Rec merger ** *+ ++ ** * * • 
* p < .05 **p<.01 
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Table 6.14 
Size Distribution of Firms 
Item US 
% 
Canada 
% 
Small 64.7 57.5 
Mid market 35.3 41.8 
Large corporate 0.0 0.7 
Total 100 100 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
"Severe adversity can undermine (the power of 
management) to some extent by leading other 
constituents to question the wisdom of managers 
and by increasing the firm's dependence on fresh 
resources that are controlled by others". 
- Philip Nelson (1981, p.69) 
In this section, an overview of the study and its main 
conclusions are presented. The weakness in the study and the 
limitations it imposes on the conclusions are described, and 
implications drawn both for managers and for further 
research. 
A. Summary 
The role of commercial banks as an external agent 
triggering recognition of decline of a firm and their 
response strategies is explored in this study. 
A review of the literature on business decline and 
turnaround shows that scholars have looked at: the causes 
for decline, prediction of failure, management of decline, 
types of turnaround strategies, and the need for management 
change as a precondition for or a part of turnaround. 
Management literature has also emphasized that an incumbent 
management is often guilty of delaying acknowledgement of 
the severity of its problems until it is quite late but 
ignores the question of recognition which is considered 
important by crisis theory. Examining the circumstances 
surrounding the decline of a firm, studies have suggested 
that it is possible to conceive of different levels of 
severity of the problem. While largely ignored by the 
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management literature, a few scholars have suggested the 
possibility of sources external to the firm playing a part 
during this critical phase in the failure-turnaround 
sequence. It still needed to be examined whether the role 
included recognition of the problems facing the firm, and 
whether it could extend to influencing the firm's actions in 
its response to the problem. 
With this background, the commercial bank was chosen as 
it is well situated to be an external source of recognition. 
Research has indicated that default on loans occurs earlier 
than filing for bankruptcy and cash flow crises are seen as 
early symptoms of a firm's difficulties. Thus, a commercial 
bank which is an external agency privy to confidential 
information and closely monitoring the performance of its 
client and to whom the client would approach for resolution 
of liquidity problems, can be an influential trigger for 
recognition. 
The study was designed to explore how banks view 
problem loans, the process by which they recognize the 
problems, and the nature of their responses. An~ additional 
benefit of this approach is that it provided an opportunity 
for examining primary data and getting a glimpse of the 
process while a crisis is developing and actually taking 
place, rather than in retrospect. Given the differences in 
banking and regulatory structures, it is valuable to look at 
these questions in both US and Canadian banks as one sheds 
light on the other. 
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Through qualitative (interviews) and quantitative 
(questionnaire) means, data was collected on how banks 
distinguish between decline and failure, the cues that are 
used to identify a problem loan, and the array of responses 
a bank uses to intervene in the situation. An explanatory 
model using multiple regression is presented, to examine the 
joint effect of the various elements on the response 
strategies. Finally, the effects of the size of the firms, 
lender liability, and the variance between banks is . • 
discussed. The results of the study is not to show that the 
banks' view of the business failure is correct. Rather, it 
is to show how banks as external agents are a source of 
early recognition and their role extends to influencing the 
strategy of the firm. 
B. Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this study examined at 
different parts of the report are as presented below. 
a) A business decline and failure situation is viewed 
by the bank as a problem loan. It is an important objective 
of the bank to recognize a problem loan early and respond to 
it by attempting to resolve the problem rather than take 
drastic measures such as liquidation. In the early stages of 
the problem in a firm, it is in the bank's interest to bring 
them to the attention of the client for early resolution. As 
the problems worsen and become more severe and the bank 
feels its assets being threatened, the same goal congruence 
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need not exist since the bank is primarily concerned with 
protecting its own interests. 
b) In identifying a problem loan, banks do make 
important distinctions in categorizing the severity of the 
problem. The key distinction is between a decline in the 
performance of the firm which is not life threatening and 
one which in fact is. In a stage of decline, the banks view 
the problems as minor when the ability of the firm to repay 
is not threatened; impending failure is a state which 
threatens that ability. 
c) Through a risk rating system, banks attempt to 
structure and formalize their recognition and response 
mechanisms. Apart from providing guidelines, the systems 
attempt to make as objective as possible what is basically a 
very subjective decision. Response decisions are strongly 
influenced by very qualitative factors such as 'trust' and 
'cooperation' of the client, judgement of the client's 
'ability' to turnaround, etc. The response of the bank not 
only depends on its understanding of the causes for decline 
(internal and external reasons) but is also influenced by 
the bank's judgement of the client's ability to turnaround, 
extent of security coverage available to the bank, its 
judgement of the severity of the problem, and its 
understanding of the cooperation of the client in working 
with the bank to resolve the problems. The size of the firm 
with its implication for the separation of ownership and 
management, also plays a role. 
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d) It is more meaningful to talk in terms of two levels 
of recognition and response by the bank; at the level of the 
loan officer and at the institutional level of the bank. The 
loan officer as the first line of defence, not only provides 
an early warning to the client but operating with slightly 
different objectives can be more accommodating. The loan 
officer attempts to preserve the bank's relationship with 
the client, for frequently as yet there is little threat to 
banks' funds, and the firm's problems are still at an early 
stage. When the handling of the loan is transferred to 
higher levels within the bank, problems are more severe, 
there is greater threat to the bank's funds and the bank has 
to be primarily concerned with its self-interest. 
e) In comparing the process of recognition and response 
between US and Canada, while there were few differences 
between the two, the differences in the correlation 
structures show differences in approaches. While both the US 
and Canadian officers preferred a workout to an exit 
strategy, the US officers have a bias towards additional 
financial coverage while the Canadian officers prefer a 
managerial approach to workout. The latter show a greater 
willingness to use consultants as part of the turnaround 
effort and, perhaps due to less concerns about lender 
liability, would consider managerial changes as part of a 
primary workout strategy. Differences also emerged in 
classification and handling of the loan. 
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f) An attempt to represent the role of the commercial 
bank in a dynamic form is shown in Fig. 2 (p. 165). With the 
perspective of the firm, Fig. 1 (p. 36) visualizes the 
recognition process and the possible role of external 
agents. Narrowing it down to the bank as a representative 
case, Fig. 2 captures the results of the study focusing on 
the role of the bank as an external agent. The 
decline/failure of the firm will inexorably move it towards 
liquidation if left unattended. The bank plays a role 
through recognition and reponds with a workout strategy to 
aid the firm towards a revival. This is determined by the 
bank's objective, which can be characterized as enlightened 
self-interest. Depending on the combination of causes, 
severity of the problem, extent of security coverage, 
cooperation of the management, the bank's judgment of the 
management's ability to turnaround, and the size of the 
firm, the bank either works towards a revival or pushes for 
liquidation. 
The levels of response are designated by the two 
overlapping triangles where the initial stages fall within 
the purview of the loan officer, gradually giving in to an 
institutional response of the bank concerned with protecting 
its interests. The dotted lines show the influence of one 
while within the purview of the other. 
C. Limitations of the Study 
As explained in Chapter IV discussing the research 
methodology, empirical studies into questions of decline and 
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turnaround present additional difficulties when compared to 
normal empirical inquiry. Questions of failure and crisis 
are not as pleasant to discuss as those of growth and 
success. There are complications due to confidentiality and 
a lack of inclination on the part of the individual to 
discuss these issues even if the time were available. 
This study also has its share of trade-offs. The nature 
and content of issues that were intended for study were seen 
as sensitive by the banks and it was not possible to expect 
participation on the basis of random selection. This 
prevents easy generalizations being made on the basis of 
this study and should be borne in mind. 
The literature review suggested the possibility of the 
external recognition originating from among several 
stakeholders. While it is argued that the bank is a very 
influential participant in the process of recognition, it is 
only one among others which could include an investor group, 
venture capitalists, auditors, etc. In specific case 
situations, there are different combinations of these 
external agencies at work in the firm. Thus, tire role of the 
commercial bank must be viewed in that perspective of being 
one among several possible triggers, albeit a very 
influential one. 
By looking at the decline and failure of the firm 
though the eyes of the bank, the view tends to be one-sided. 
It was not possible to get references from the banks to talk 
to the clients for their perspective on the process of 
recognition and the bank's influence. 
Banks are not perfect in their judgement or management. 
Banks are also susceptible to failure themselves. In 
addition, recent reports on the high percentage of non¬ 
performing loans in the portfolio of the Bank of New England 
and others can raise doubts on the efficacy of the 
recognition and response procedures of the banks. 
In spite of these limitations this methodology of 
combining qualitative and quantitative techniques for 
exploring issues (the importance of which have been 
overlooked in the literature) through collection of primary 
data provides a better understanding of business decline and 
the turnaround process. 
D. Implications for Research and Management 
As noted above, the study makes a positive contribution 
to our understanding of the process of decline and the early 
stages of turnaround. Drawing on the need for early 
recognition of crisis from the crisis management literature, 
this study establishes the importance of problem awareness 
in the study of decline. Recognition of the severity of 
business decline is critical and affects the probability of 
success of a turnaround strategy since the earlier the 
recognition, the less the severity of the problem and the 
greater the chances of success. 
Studies in the field of decline and turnaround have 
tended to view the role of management to the exclusion of 
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external influences. It is assumed that management makes the 
recognition, earlier or later, and the existing or new 
management initiates a turnaround strategy. This study draws 
attention to the role of external influences in recognition 
of the problem and their effect on the turnaround strategy. 
The response of the bank to a problem loan, looked at from 
the perspective of the firm, is an external influence on the 
turnaround strategy. We have seen that there are various 
influences affecting this response. Management literature 
which directly links a turnaround strategy to the causes for 
decline errs to the extent that external influences, and 
motives behind that influence, are not taken into account. 
Management literature has frequently stressed the role 
of bad management as one of the major causes of decline and 
efforts continue to try to pin down these factors 
collectively known as 'bad management'. This study reveals a 
similar attempt on the part of a bank, while conducting the 
strategic analysis of the client, to judge management and 
appraise its ability to turnaround the firm. Research into 
questions of management change as part of a turnaround 
strategy would benefit from including consideration of the 
measures used by banks for the same purpose. With management 
change being a part of the array of responses of a bank, 
this study also hints at how the change could possibly be 
initiated, which is an issue not considered in the 
literature. 
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Empirical research in the field of decline and 
turnaround has suffered from a bias towards large firms on 
whom data is more easily available in the form of published 
case studies, data bases, etc. In smaller firms there is 
little separation between ownership and control, and 
management change is not always the only or most viable 
option. The array of responses used by a bank gives an 
indication that in addition to management change, other 
interventions are possible in the situation. 
When a firm is in a stage of growth and prosperity, the 
stakeholders claim their share and leave management to 
manage. When times are bad and the firm is in a decline, 
strains begin to show. When failure seems possible, the 
stakeholders rush to protect their interests which often 
diverge from those of the management. This study highlights 
the real possibility of this divergence in the case of 
banks. There is a need for further research into the 
conflicting influences of different stakeholders serving 
their self-interests and impinging upon the turnaround 
strategy of the weakened firm. 
The above discussion suggests that further research 
into questions of decline and turnaround needs to take into 
account external influences, alternate interventions, and 
the size of the firm as important factors. There is a need 
to temper this view of the banker with an inquiry into the 
view of the firm in the same situation. The ultimate effect 
on the firm (which is the victim in the situation) is as a 
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result of the resolution or the conflict between the forces 
involved. Case studies looking at several external 
influences on the firm will enable researchers to identify 
situational factors enabling one set of external forces to 
be more dominant than another. 
A direct implication of this study for managers is an 
understanding of the objectives of the banker (similar to 
those of the firm in the early stages) assists the manager 
in dealing with the bank and taking advantage of its 
assistance, while the matter is still in the purview of the 
loan officer. Openness with the banker in admitting the 
problems and seeking assistance can be beneficial to the 
firm. Management which recognizes and admits its problems 
and has developed a turnaround plan is in a better position 
to deal with the bank, and to seek their assistance. 
A development of this argument is that a firm is better 
off initiating action on its own rather than waiting till an 
external recognition of its failure which brings with it 
external influences on the strategy of the firm and detracts 
the CEO from trying to meet the firm's objectives on his or 
her own. When such external influences do start impinging on 
a firm attempting a turnaround, an appreciation of the 
conflicts in the objectives of the external influences and 
those of the firm are a first step in attempting to 
reconcile them. 
This study also highlights the importance of adequate 
training in workout for a loan officer. As the first line of 
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defence in a situation where the earlier it is, the simpler 
it is, a loan officer can play a key role. 
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AFTER'<*0? I 
A decade ago, Dave Vhetten 1930 -rote an article 
titled,'Organizational decline: A neglected topic in 
organizational science’. It was very heartening to read 
since I case into the doctoral program with an interest in 
research in decline and turnaround issues. As I reviewed the 
research in the field, I tecase even nore convinced of the 
truth of Vhetten*s resarhs. Our understanding about this 
subject is fragmented and there is very little cross- 
fertilization of ideas even within ranagenent; researchers 
have examined issues fro® the perspectives of strategic 
managerert, organizational behavior, accounting, eic. 
without borrowing insights frcn each other. 
My personal experience as a turnaround aanager. and the 
frequent coisents I read in press reports cn failing rims 
convinced ae of the need to examine the role of stakeholders 
in influencing the event in a declining firm. The literature 
has totally ignored these issues which, in ay opinion is a 
serious gap. 
It was after I started atteapttng to narrow down ay 
focus that I began to understand the probleas of doing 
research in this field, which could partly explain the 
sparse nature of eaptrical studies. But it is a_so me 
peculiar mixture of a sparsely researched area ccarinei -im 
the challenges of doing research that has kept my interest 
high right through the dissertation. 1 faced difficulties m 
getting banks to participate, and aa sti_I trying to 
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convinve them to let me talk to their problem loan clients. 
To seek information from a firm's perspective I have, 
independent of the banks, tried to track down failing firms 
through news reports and have approached them directly. I am 
yet to strike a lode! I even approached a national bankers 
association to provide me wth their membership list so that 
I could mail my questionnaire directly to randomly chosen 
loan officers. They declined. I kept on my research because 
I felt that understanding the bank's perspective is 
important and sacrificing randomness, matched samples, etc. 
was a price that was worth paying. 
During times of growth and success of a firm, 
stakeholders prefer to sit back and identify with it, and 
happily accept their share of the returns with an occasional 
wrangle about the size of the slice. The moment an 
organization is in a state of decline, stakeholders 
including the incumbent management appear to forsake its 
interests while protecting their own. That is what makes 
turnaround so difficult; a company cannot act for itself and 
must depend on others who no longer seem to strongly 
identify with its interests. 
I intend to pursue this line of inquiry on external 
influences on the firm during its decline-turnaround 
sequence as part of my research agenda for a few more years. 
It requires innovative research designs but there is a 
crying need for more and more research in this field, 
especially when it is of immediate use for a manager. 
APPENDIX A 
BANKING AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
This appendix is intended to provide a brief 
introduction to the banking and regulatory environment in 
the US and Canada. As this study views business failures 
from the perspective of commercial banks, only those aspects 
of the industry as are pertinent for an understanding of the 
discussion elsewhere in this report will be presented. It is 
beyond the scope here to provide a full comparison or 
discussion of either the banking industry or of related 
regulation. Boreham (1987) provides a good survey and this 
chapter will essentially borrow from his and other studies. 
The Banking Sector in Canada and the US 
The US banking system (often called the unit banking 
system) operates under two charters existing side by side. 
There are the national banks, chartered by the federal 
government and supervised by the Controller of Currency, and 
the state banks chartered by the state governments and also 
supervised by them. The former are larger institutions 
though the latter are more numerous. Commercial banks are 
prohibited by the McFadden Act of 1927 from branching across 
state lines and the national banks are permitted to branch 
within the state only to the extent of the state banks. 
The Canadian commercial banking system consists of 
eight widely held and domestically owned banks and 59 
closely held and foreign owned banks. They are all chartered 
or incorporated by the federal government. There are no 
restrictions on branch expansion. 
Banks in Canada are larger generally both in terms of 
assets and in terms of branches. 
Bankruptcy Regulation in Canada and the US 
In the US, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 governs 
the administrative, procedural, and legal requirements of 
bankruptcy filing in the US. (Altman, 1983, provides a 
thorough review of the provisions). Chapter 7 deals with 
involuntary liquidation and Chapter 11 with reorganization. 
Two major benefits of the Chapter 11 provisions are that 
there is no need to prove insolvency to seek the protection 
of the courts and there is an automatic stay of creditor 
action to attempt a reorganization plan. 
Canadian bankruptcy is governed by the Bankruptcy Act, 
originally passed in 1949 and largely unchanged except for 
some revisions in 1966. Under this, secured creditors can 
move in without notice to close down a company in arrears 
before other creditors have a chance to find out. While 
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there are provisions for a company to hold off creditors 
momentarily, the procedures are considered to be both 
difficult and expensive. 
As compared to the US, Canada has the facility of 
receivership whereby a person in the nature of a trustee of 
the court, takes charge of the property. The debtor is not 
deprived of the ownership of the property but is not 
entitled to deal with it. A receiver can also be appointed 
by mutual consent of the debtor and creditor without the 
intervention of the court. 
It is commonly believed that the laws favor the debtor 
in the US and the creditor in Canada. Recently, as a 
substitute for a Chapter 11, the Company Creditors 
Arrangements Act, 1933, has been revived through increased 
use. Originally enacted to help financially troubled railway 
companies with outstanding bonds get a stay of proceedings 
against secured and unsecured creditors, it has been 
recently used in courts as a form of Chapter 11. 
There have been frequent demands in Canada for 
revisions in Bankruptcy laws to make them more favorable to 
the debtor and in line with the US laws. Banks have been 
frequently accused of being benign to large debtors and 
harsh towards small and medium firms and the demand has been 
to level the playing field. Reforms have often been proposed 
but none has become law as yet. With court decisions often 
influenced by legal thinking in the US and a lack of clarity 
in the laws, some progressive bankers have also begun to 
favor a rewriting of the laws if only to clear the 
confusion. 
appendix b 
INTRODUCTORY LETTER TO BANKS 
INSTITUTE FOR NORTH AMERICAN 
TRADE AND ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST 
School ol Management 
Amherst. MA 01003 
(413) 545 3253 
20 Apr 1989 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
The Institute for North American Trade and Economics 
was established in 1986 to study and research economic 
issues of joint interest to Canada and the US and to offer 
objective counsel aimed at expanded benefits to them. We 
have cooperative research arrangements with the University 
of Western Ontario, Dalhousie University, and Laval 
University. 
One of our researchers, C.Gopinath, is interested in 
the field of business failures and turnaround strategies. 
For the purpose of his dissertation research, he is 
undertaking a study of the role commercial banks play in 
Canada and the US in recognizing the failure of clients (for 
example, by identifying problem loans), and their subsequent 
responses. 
In this connection, he would like to 
a. Interview a few of your officers who are involved 
in commercial lending and the workout of problem 
loans, and 
b. Distribute a questionnaire to a larger number of 
your commercial loan officers who may have problem 
loans in their portfolio. The response would be 
anonymous. 
I would be grateful if you would permit Mr. Gopinath to 
take advantage of the experience and expertise of your bank 
in this venture. We would, of course, give you a summary of 
our findings. 
Sincerely, 
UUtiJJt*- 
A. Elliott Carlisle 
Director 
APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The following were used as a basis for conducting the 
interviews. They were not provided to the interviewer but 
retained by the researcher. Following an open-ended format, 
the discussion was allowed to proceed as it developed. 
1. How does the bank define a problem loan? 
2. What is the overall approximate percentage of troubled 
loans in the banks portfolio? 
3. How does the bank view a problem loan? Any standard 
policies to deal with them? Any documents ? 
4. What is the process by which a troubled loan gets 
identified? 
5. Administratively, are the functions of loan review, 
workout, and asset recovery separated or combined within a 
department? 
6. Is the loan officer involved with the loan till the end 
or is it taken over by another team once classified as a 
problem loan? 
7. What is the extent of discretion given to a loan officer 
in classifying a problem loan? Please explain. 
8. What role does the number or quantum of problem loans in 
a loan officers portfolio play in his/her performance 
evaluation? 
9. In formulating its response, does the bank make a 
distinction between decline in the financial performance of 
the client (including losses), and the client's survival 
being threatened? If so, how is the distinction-made ? 
10. As soon as the bank is concerned that the client is in a 
state of decline, is this communicated to the client 
immediately (even if the funds are not at risk) or is there 
a time lag before the client is informed? 
11. What is the nature of the client's reaction when 
informed? Any disagreements? 
12. When the client's credit rating is reclassified 
downward, is he/she told about it? 
13. While the bank has to be primarily concerned with 
protecting its funds at risk, do you also visualize the 
172 
bank's role as including other factors such as providing an 
early warning, helping the client overcome problems, etc. ? 
14. Some of these objectives could be in conflict with each 
other. How do they get resolved in the process of responding 
to the client? 
15. How do you formulate your strategy to respond to the 
client's problems? 
16. How do you communicate to the client the actions you 
would like taken to turnaround? Keep track? 
17. Would the size of the client make a significant 
difference to your response? (eg. large vs small, if the 
firm is not owner managed and there is a professional 
management in place). - • 
18. The question of lender liability is sometimes mentioned 
in the press as making banks more conservative. Do you think 
it is a significant factor in your response? 
19. Do you think there are situations where banks have to 
take part of the blame for a client's difficulty? (Such as 
improper scrutiny, over lending, etc.) 
20. What are the elements of the existing Banking or other 
regulations which dictate or influence your current 
responses to problem loans? What changes would you like in 
these? 
21. If problem loans can be looked upon as an early step in 
a firm's decline or failure, how do you look at the role 
banks play or could play in this regard? 
22. Are there any other comments that you would like to make 
on the question of problem loan recognition, or response, or 
business failures in general? 
APPENDIX D 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTITUTE FOR NORTH AMERICAN 
TRADE AND ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST 
School ol Management 
Amhersl. MA 01003 
(413) 545 3253 
22 Nov 1989 
Dear Account Manager/Loan Officer. 
Bank • 
We are undertaking a study into business failures, and 
as a part of that, we are trying to understand the processes 
used by commercial loan officers in classifying and 
responding to problem loans. We believe the step of 
classifying a problem loan to be an important early 
indication of a failing business. We request your assistance 
in this study by completing the attached questionnaire. Your 
response will be completely anonymous and confidential; 
neither your's nor any client's name is required. 
There are two parts to the questionnaire. Part A 
includes general questions about your operations. 
Part B involves questions about any client whose loan 
is currently considered to be troubled or a problem. Kindly 
Itppn a sDecific troubled loan case in mind while you respond 
to the questions in this part. Preferably choose a client 
who has been in business for five years. I would appreciate 
it if you would replicate this for two problem loan cases, 
if possible, with each one representing a different type of 
troubled loan in your portfolio. (Two copies of Part B are 
attached. ) 
This survey should take only 10-15 minutes to complete. 
I would appreciate your completing it now .and returning it 
in the self-addressed envelope attached. If you would like 
to attach any additional pages in support of your responses, 
you are welcome to do so. 
I greatly appreciate your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
C.Gopinath 
Research Associate 
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Parc A 
Genera] 
1. How many years of experience do you have as a loan officer? 
_ years 
. Whac is Che approximace number of problem loans you have handled to 
ate? 
- V 
3. Do you specialize in any particular industry, sector, or type of loan? 
_ No, I don't. 
_ Yes, I do. (please specify) 
-1. How are loans monitored by you on an on-going basis? (Please FILL in the 
appropriate number) 
1 = Monthly 2 = Quarterly 3 = Annual -1 = Ad hoc 
5 = Not used 
_ financial / operating reports 
_ comparing performance with plans 
_ credit reports from bureaus 
_ plant visits 
_ other (please describe) 
5. How do you define a problem loan? Are there standard policies to deal 
with them? (You may attach any document to support your answer, if you so 
desire). 
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6. In formulating your response, do you make a distinction between decline 
in the financial performance of the client (including losses), and the 
client's survival being threatened ? If so, how is the distinction made? 
7. In addition to your primary objective in protecting the bank's funds, do 
you visualize your role as including the following? 
(Please FILL in 1 if Very Important, 2 if Somewhat Important, and 3 if 
Unimportant) 
Provide an early warning to a firm of an impending crisis 
Help a client, to the extent possible, in overcoming 
problems 
(any other)_ 
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Part B 
Client # II 
Kindlv keep in mind the case of ONE PARTICULAR problem loan in YOUR 
PORTFOLIO while answering questions in this part. 
Data on the Client 
1. What is the approximajg_age of the business? 
• Less 
6-10 
than 3 years 
years *•* 
\ 4-5 years 
More than 10 years 
2. What is the approximate size of the firm? 
S Assets S Sales 
3. How would the bank consider the size of the firm? 
_ small 
 mid market 
_ large corporate 
4. How long has this firm been a client of the bank? 
_ years (approximate) 
5. What is the nature of the firm's activity? (please check as 
appropriate) 
_ agriculture,forestry & fishing 
 mining & manufacturing 
_ transportation & public utilities 
 wholesale trade 
_ retail trade 
 finance, insurance & real estate 
_ services 
 (other)_ 
6. Is the firm owner managed? 
_ Yes 
_ No, there is a separation between ownership 
and management 
To what extent is the loan secured ? 
_ fully 
_ partly 
unsecured 
7. 
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Part B, Client # II (contd.) 
8. How convertible is the collateral? (please check one) 
_ easily 
_ with difficulty 
_ other 
9. Are you the sole lending bank ? 
a lead bank in a consortium 
one i^n a consortium 
10. How many successive quarters of loss have been sustained ? 
Net loss _ quarters 
Cash loss _ quarters 
11. What would be the approximate percentage of accumulated losses to the 
net worth of the firm? 
Yes 
No, we are 
No, we are 
12. In your opinion, is the present insolvency or financial embarassment of 
this client one which (please check one) 
_ is not a major problem and could be corrected soon 
_ could develop into a major crisis if ignored 
_ is already threatening the survival of the firm 
13. Is the loan presently being handled by you ? 
_ Yes, exclusively. 
_ Yes, with assistance from Loan Review/Workout dept. 
_ No, it has been transferred to Workout though I am 
still involved. 
_ It has been transferred to Workout and .1 am not 
involved. 
14. Does the bank hold stock in the client firm directly or as collateral? 
15. 
_ Yes, directly 
_ Yes, as collateral 
_ Neither directly nor as collateral 
Are the bank’s representatives on the client's board or 
management? 
Yes No 
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Part B, Client ft II (contd.) 
16. Is the client on the bank’s board or committee? 
_Board _Committee _Neither 
Recognition of the Problem 
17. What were the main cues used to IDENTIFY THIS client as a problem 
loan? (Please circle^the most appropriate response). 
Analysis of financial ratios 
Deviation of performance from plan 1 
Declining sales trend 1 
Declining profits trend 1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
Inadequate cash flow 
Deteriorating receivables 
Slow inventory turnover 
Extended trade payables 
12 3 
12 3 
1 2 3 
12 3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Change in accountants 
Change in key stockholders 
and executives 
Credit inquiries from trade 
Problems of the industry 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
Personal factors (death, 
divorce,etc) 
Delayed submission of 
financial statements 
Reluctance to share 
information with the bank 
Occurrence of Overdraft's 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Delinquent or slow loan payments 1 
Qualification in the audit report 1 
Other (please specify) 
. 1 
. 1 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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Part B, Client fl II (contd.) 
18. How long after a problem was identified was the firm classified as a 
"problem loan"? 
weeks/months 
(please check time unit which is applicable) 
19. How long after you identified 
the bank's concern? 
_ weeks/months 
(please check 
20. When informed, did the 
firm's performance was 
the problem was the client informed of 
time unit which is applicable) 
the bank's judgement that the 
for concern? 
client accept 
a major cause 
Yes, they did. 
No, they did not. 
The client recognized the problem and 
voluntarily notified the bank 
21. Which one of the following statements would best describe the firm when 
it was classified as a problem loan, (please check) 
_ The problems were of a temporary nature which could be 
tackled 
_ The problems were serious causing a decline in financial 
performance but not critical 
_ The firm was in a crisis which threatened its survival 
22. Did the bank have to "shock" the client into recognizing 
the situation as a crisis (e.g. additional credit being 
made conditional to changes, etc.) 
_ Yes _No 
23. This loan could have become troubled due to a variety of causes. If you 
were to allot 100*6 among three broad categories as contributing to the 
problem loan, how would you distribute it in this case ? 
_ \ Firm (Bad management of operations, poor 
strategy/planning, incompetence, etc.) 
__ \ Bank (High interest rate, ill conceived terms, 
overlending, anxjery for income for the bank, poor 
review and audit, competition with other banks, 
etc.) 
_ \ Environment ( Factors beyond firm or bank’s control such 
as recession, disaster, government policies, etc.) 
100 \ 
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Part B, Client ft II (contd.) 
24. What, in vour opinion, were the CAUSES FOR THE DECLINE in financial 
performance of the firm? 
(Please circle the most appropriate response). 
Decreased profit margins of 
the products 
Increased competition in 
the industry 
High interest rates 
Declining market size of the 
industry 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Inadequate sales 
High overheads 
Heavy operating expenses 
Receivables difficulties 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Incompetent management 
Unbalanced experience in the 
top team 
One-man rule 
Competitively weak 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 
1 
1 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 -5 
2 3 4 5 
Neglect (family/marital 
problems, health etc) 
Fraud 
Disaster (fire, burglary) 
Other (please specify) 
12 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
12 3 
1 2 3 
12 3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
6 
Fart B, Client 8 II (contd.) 
Response 
25. What are the considerations influencing the RESPONSE OF THE BANK in 
this case? 
(Please circle the most appropriate response.) 
Public image 
Borrower's positive attitude 
towards the debt 
Borrower’s negative attitude 
towards the debt 
Judgement on the client's 
ability to turnaround and 
repay 
Collateral value to loan amount 
Value of the client to the 
bank as a customer 
Cost of collection of the loan 
Cost and effort in 
rehabilitation of the borrower 
Which method wi)l net the bank 
the greatest return on 
funds extended 
Effect of the bank's action 
on the community 
Firm's performance in 
relation to the industry 
Lender liability issues 
Protection of the bank's 
funds at risk 
Attitude of the other creditors 
Others (please specify) 
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Part B, Client # II (contd.) 
26.- Which of the following types of INTERVENTION are under 
consideration or have been implemented? (Please circle the most 
appropriate response). 
Seeking additional collateral 
for existing loans 
Seeking guarantees in addition 
to existing collateral 
Granting additional loans with 
collateral/guarantees 
Time extension of the due 
date of the debt 
Partial forgiveness of the debt 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Sale of loan to another bank 1 
Terminate the loan allowing 
client time to find another bank 1 
Recommend additional capitalization 1 
Recommend downsizing business/asset 
divestment 1 
Recommend merger/ acquisition 
by another 1 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
Recommend change of top 
management (CEO) 1 
Recommend change of key 
personnel (GM, Accountant, etc.) 1 
Recommend change of strategies 1 
Recommend use of consultants 1 
Suggest improvement in systems 
& controls 1 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 5 
Suggest improvements in 
operations/ cost reductions 
Recall of loan 
Proceed to recover through 
State courts 
Proceed to recover through 
Federal Bankruptcy court 
Settle out of court 
with loss of interest 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
in in 
in
 
in
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Part B, Client ft II (contd.) 
Settle out of court with 
loss of principal and interest 
Exchange of debt for an 
.equity position 
Other (please specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
General 
Are there any other comments you would like to make about the issue of 
problem loans, firms facing a failure, or this questionnaire? 
APPENDIX E 
REGULATORY GUIDELINES ON PROBLEM LOANS 
Extracts from regulatory guidelines in the US and 
Canada on the handling of problem loans are given below. 
These are used by the examiners of the respective banking 
systems to supervise the status of problem loans in the 
banks from the point of view of accounting for them and 
providing for reserves. They serve as the basis on which 
member banks establish their rating systems which usually 
are more elaborate and in greater detail. 
US 
(Extracts from "Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank 
Examiners", August 1985) 
Careful analysis, coupled with discussions with officers and 
directors, enables the examiner to pinpoint loans which need 
strengthening and careful management if they are to be 
collected. Such assets are assigned a quality rating based 
on the examiner's best judgement concerning the degree of 
risk and the likelihood of orderly liquidation. In 
determining what credits are to be criticized, the examiner 
must utilize mature credit judgment. No formula covers all 
the various types of loans made by banks. 
Even a loan that is current and supported by underlying 
collateral or contingent obligors may be criticized.. 
Conversely, not all delinquent loans should be classified. 
The original source of repayment and the borrower's ability 
to utilize it should be a determining factor in criticizing 
a loan....Criticized assets are categorized into four 
following classifications: 
1. Other Assets Especially Mentioned 
Assets in this category are currently protected but are 
potentially weak...(These) have potential weaknesses which 
may, if not checked or corrected, weaken the asset or 
inadequately protect the bank's credit position at some 
future date. ...An adverse trend in the obligor's operations 
or an imbalanced position in the balance sheet which has not 
reached a point where the liquidation is jeopardized, may 
best be handled by this classification. 
2. Substandard Assets 
A substandard asset is inadequately protected by the current 
sound worth and paying capacity of the obligor or of the 
collateral pledged, if any...They are characterized by the 
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distinct possibility that the bank will sustain some loss if 
the deficiencies are not corrected. 
3. Doubtful Assets 
An asset classified doubtful has all the weaknesses 
inherent in one classified substandard with the added 
characteristic that the weaknesses make collection or 
liquidation in full, on the basis of currently existing 
facts, conditions, and values, highly questionable and 
improbable. 
4. Loss Assets 
Assets classified loss are considered uncollectible and of 
such little value that their continuance as bankable assets 
is not warranted. 
Canada 
(Extracts from the "Guidelines to Banks", July 1986, issued 
by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions). 
Non-performing loans comprise of non-accrual and 
renegotiated reduced rate loans... Non-accrual loans are 
defined as loans on which interest is not being accrued due 
to the existence of reasonable doubt as to the ultimate 
collectibility of principal or interest. Loans where 
interest is contractually past due 90 days are automatically 
to be placed on a non-accrual basis, unless senior credit 
management determines that there is no reasonable doubt as 
to the ultimate collectibility of principal or interest. 
The override clause in the non-accrual loan definition is 
intended to provide management of banks with a degree of 
flexibility where the borrower may be more than 90 days in 
arrears on interest payments, but where management expects 
the arrearage will be eliminated in the normal course of 
business; for instance where the loan is well secured. 
Renegotiated reduced rate loans are defined as loans where 
terms have been modified to provide for a reduction in the 
interest rate due to the weakened financial condition of the 
borrower. 
(The risk categories are:) 
a. Satisfactory 
Acceptable Risk 
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b. Especially Mentioned 
An asset or contingent risk which, £lthough considered 
collectible on the basis of the security presently held, 
(including guarantees and letters of comfort/awareness 
provided adequate financial data is held in support 
thereof.) has apparent weaknesses and/or undesirable 
features to which attention is directed. These would include 
under-capitalization, continuing operating losses and/or 
other undesirable features. 
c. Below Standard 
A substandard asset or contingent risk not adequately 
supported by security values and/or repayment capacity 
and/or carrying capacity. There are well defined weaknesses 
which could jeopardize ultimate collection of all principal 
and interest. Loans in this category may be designated 
"accrual" or "non-accrual" depending on the current status 
of interest payments and the value of the underlying 
security. 
d. Loss 
An asset of contingent risk where a partial or full 
write-off is the likely outcome. These assets/risks should 
invariably be designated as "non-accrual" and a full or 
partial appropriation established based on an analysis of 
the security and repayment source(s). 
APPENDIX F 
EXTRACTS FROM RATING SYSTEMS 
This appendix provides extracts from the rating systems 
of three banks. They are not complete and are meant to 
illustrate the nature and detail of the topics covered 
relevant to the parts referred to in the main body the 
report. 
BANK A (Canada) 
The rating scale is comprised of ten categories 
offering adequate flexibility to recognize a wide range of 
potential risk classifications. 
In determining a final risk rating for each borrower, 
the account officer is asked to assess the borrower's 
overall performance by considering the following seven 
factors: 
a. financial performance 
b. management 
c. industry status 
d. security position 
e. terms of support 
f. account activity 
g. competitor actions 
While the process involves an indepth assessment of the 
seven factors identified, the borrower's financial condition 
and to a lesser degree the bank’s security coverage will 
continue to weigh most heavily in final risk rating 
determinations. Classification criteria reflects the 
importance placed on these factors and are formally 
introduced as trip-wires. 
Category Descriptions 
3b: Possible problem loan. 
Principal &/or interest payments may be in arrears 15 
or more days. Material adverse change in financial 
performance or security or if, in combination, any 
three factors are less than acceptable. 
Discussions with or direct involvement by Workout 
department. Intensive customer negotiations, etc. 
4: Actual problem loan. 
Principal &/or interest payment 30 or more day? in 
arrears. Agreement/decision reached to capitalize 
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interest, make specific provision, etc. Material 
adverse change in financial performance or security or 
if in combination any four factors are less than 
acceptable. 
Mandatory referral to workout department, review by 
counsel, etc. 
5: Serious problem loan. 
Principal &/or interest payments 90 days or more in 
arrears. Financial performance precludes the meeting of 
principal & interest. 
Mandatory referral to workout department, extensive 
involvement of external professionals etc. 
6: Bankruptcy, Asset liquidation. 
Filing court approval for re-organization, court 
approves or considers plan, etc. 
Decision on reserves, write-offs, aggressive 
monitoring, etc. 
Description of Assessment Factor - Management: 
Areas to be assessed include: Quality, competence, 
depth, and stability. 
Many indications of pending problems can be evident 
before management's performance results in non-performing 
assets. Examples include: 
- Lack of clear understanding of key leverage points in 
their business(es). 
- Inability to identify or implement corrective action. 
- Financial set-backs not satisfactorily explained. 
- Over-reliance on a single product/ customer/ 
supplier/ market. 
- Business plan presentations, heavy on optimism, with 
lack of thought to a worst case scenario. 
- etc. 
BANK B (Canada) 
This bank has 10 risk rating categories. Rating 5 and 
below would be problem loans. 
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Rating Description Summary: 
5: Unacceptable risk- Watch List. 
Financial position under capitalized, unbalanced debt, 
reporting losses or less than satisfactory profits, 
management weak. Insufficient security. Principal 
and/or interest current to 89 days delinquent, 
accruing. 
6: Non-performing loan, accrual. 
Weak financial condition, classified as renegotiated 
reduced rate, principal and/or interest current to 89 
days delinquent, and accruing. 
Worksheet for Classification: 
The worksheets for classification of risk cover four 
areas: Management(13), money(42), materials(16), and 
markets (12). The numbers within parentheses indicate the 
number of ‘considerations' or items under each. Samples are 
as below: 
Management: 
-Possibility of owners being unable to inject 
additional equity when needed. 
-possibility of change of control. 
-possibility of adverse effect from inadequate 
management for operations planned. 
-possibility of adverse effect from lack of adequate 
organization structure, planning, policies, etc. 
Money: 
-reliability of forecast financial information, 
-clarity of information on borrowers consolidated 
statements. 
-condition of current debt. 
-trend of net profit. 
-historical performance. 
Materials: 
-length of manufacturing period. 
-condition of inventory. 
-adequacy of fixed assets. 
Markets: 
-stability of demand. 
-vulnerability to competition. 
-vulnerability to technological change. 
BANK C (US) 
This bank has 9 risk rating categories, with 5 and 
below being watch/problem loans. 
Category Descriptions: 
5: Borderline (temporary). 
While financial condition remains satisfactory, events 
are occurring or will occur in the very near future 
which will cause the customer's risk rating to either 
remain Satisfactory (rating 4) or move to Special 
Mention. 
6: Special Mention. 
Weakened financial condition arising from negative 
trends, adverse events, and/or concerns with management 
which, if not corrected, may have a material impact on 
the servicing of the bank's exposure. 
7: Substandard. 
Unsatisfactory financial condition creating a distinct 
possibility of business failure if deficiencies are not 
corrected. 
8: Doubtful. 
Weak financial condition where full repayment of bank's 
exposure is doubtful. A partial loss of principal is 
likely. 
9: Loss. 
Any remaining principal is considered a total loss. 
Exposure, net of charge-off must be zero. 
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